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ABSTRACT
In the early weeks of the COVID-19 pandemic, the United
States Congress funded the Paycheck Protection Program
(PPP) to address the devastating consequences of business
closures and millions of employees losing both their jobs and
healthcare coverage during a public health emergency. That
program immediately pumped more than a half-trillion
dollars of forgivable loans out to five million businesses. But
criticism was swift and widespread, if sometimes spurious,
with detractors attacking the award of loans to wealthy
celebrities such as Kanye West, politically connected donors
such as the Kushner family, and large corporations such as
Shake Shack and Ruth’s Chris Steak House.
In this Article, we conduct an empirical study of the
central component of the largest financial bailout in US
history. We examine early quantitative data released by the
†Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law and Lecturer-in-Law, University
of Chicago Law School, and Ph.D. candidate, University of Chicago Department
of Sociology, respectively. The authors gratefully acknowledge the comments and
feedback from colleagues at the University of Chicago and the research assistance
of Quinn Lewis.
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Small Business Administration to answer various competing
claims about the effects of the PPP. Critics accused the
program of being administered as a partisan political tool for
President Trump’s attempted reelection, as a corrupt slush
fund for cronies of the Trump administration, and as an
incompetent waste of money on undeserving recipients. We
test these hypotheses to evaluate the distribution of funds and
whether the disbursement materially suffered from politics,
corruption, or waste. We find that the lending process not only
suffered from high-profile failures, but it also failed to target
the neediest areas, particularly early on. Other studies
present mixed findings on whether the PPP successfully
protected paychecks. The PPP’s greatest weakness was its
failure to reach businesses unable to survive long enough to
apply for or to receive loans.
Accordingly, we call for a start to the process of theorizing
a model for future programs to fund economic crises, one that
would avoid the worst mistakes of the PPP. In 2008 and
2020–2021, the US government engaged in massive transfers
of money from the federal fisc to corporations and, on both
occasions, the task was cobbled together during an
emergency, with predictable failures and shortcomings. We
consider successful economic responses and how they might
guide more effective, fair, and efficient models for providing
emergency economic funding in the future. Indeed, we may
continue to need to address the financial devastation from
COVID-19 itself for years to come.
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So Kanye and Jared Kushner’s family got PPP loans. No wonder the
Trump White House wanted to keep all this secret. That program
may go down as one of the most corrupt and wasteful in American
history.
— Ian Sams, former press secretary to Senator Kamala Harris 1

Soon after the COVID-19 virus began to fill hospital
wards across the United States with asphyxiating patients,
financial sequelae of the pandemic began to suffocate the US
stock market and wider national economy. In early 2020,
American businesses, pursuant to lockdown orders imposed
by local authorities, quickly shut their doors to patrons and
employees alike, triggering the sharpest contraction in US
GDP and jobs in the post-World War II era. 2 To triage the
consequences of stratospheric unemployment and lost
medical coverage during a public health emergency,
Congressional legislators reached for some of the
instruments they had deployed a dozen years before. The
federal government would—as it did in the 2008 financial
crisis—flood the economy with money. 3 At breakneck pace,
1. Ian Sams (@IanSams), TWITTER (July 6, 2020, 2:31 PM),
https://twitter.com/IanSams/status/1280222971701923843 (with more than 37k
retweets and 122k likes as of December 27, 2021).
2. See, e.g., Ben Casselman, Worst Economy in a Decade. What’s Next? ‘Worst
in our Lifetime,’ N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/29
/business/economy/us-gdp.html.
3. See generally HENRY PAULSON ET AL., FIREFIGHTING: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
ITS LESSONS (2019); ADAM TOOZE, CRASHED: HOW A DECADE OF FINANCIAL
CRISES CHANGED THE WORLD (2018); David Zaring, The Government’s Economic
Response to the COVID Crisis, 40 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. (forthcoming 2021),
AND
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Congress appropriated hundreds of billions of dollars to
protect paychecks and, just as quickly, entrepreneurs, large
publicly traded companies, and swindlers began to dip their
buckets into that river of money. 4
In this Article, we provide an empirical analysis of
America’s financial response to COVID-19 to construct a
theoretical framework for governmental economic funding in
times of crisis. 5 The outcomes from this pandemic—both
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3662049; Michael S. Barr et al., The Financial
Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ., Research
Paper No. 20-040, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3666461.
4. See, e.g., Chris Cillizza, How, Exactly, Did the LA Lakers Get a “Small
Business” Loan?, CNN (Apr. 28, 2020, 10:59 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020
/04/28/politics/lakers-ppp-small-business/index.html; Sarah Hansen, Ruth’s
Chris Steak House Returns $20 Million PPP Loan Amid Public Backlash as
Treasury Issues New Guidance, FORBES (Apr. 23, 2020, 4:51 PM), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/sarahhansen/2020/04/23/ruths-chris-steak-house-returns-20million-ppp-loan-as-treasury-issues-new-guidance/?sh=1d1a29146ef7; Michelle
Toh, Shake Shack Returns $10 Million Emergency Loan to the US Government,
CNN, (Apr. 20, 2020, 10:56 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/20/business
/shake-shack-ppp-loan-sba/index.html.
5. Early published legal scholarship on the federal legislative response to
COVID-19 has discussed constitutional issues. See generally, e.g., Brian Soucek,
Discriminatory Paycheck Protection, 11 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 319 (2020). Two
groups of legal scholars have produced working papers on the government’s
financial response to the pandemic. See Zaring, supra note 3; Barr et al., supra
note 3. Additionally, several groups of economists have examined portions of
preliminary data. See, e.g., Haoyang Liu & Desi Volker, Where Have the Paycheck
Protection Loans Gone So Far?, N.Y. FED. RSRV. BANK (May 6, 2020), https://
libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2020/05/where-have-the-paycheck-protec
tion-loans-gone-so-far/; David Autor et al., An Evaluation of the Paycheck
Protection Program Using Administrative Payroll Microdata (July 22, 2020)
(MIT Working Paper Series), https://economics.mit.edu/files/20094; Joao Granja
et al., Did the Paycheck Protection Program Hit the Target? 1 (Univ. of Chicago,
Becker Friedman Inst. for Econ., Working Paper No. 2020-52, 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3585258; Alexander Bartik et al., Measuring the Labor
Market at the Onset of the COVID-19 Crisis, (Univ. of Chicago, Becker Friedman
Inst. for Econ., Working Paper No. 2020-83, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract
=3633053; Raj Chetty et al., How Did Covid-19 and Stabilization Policies Affect
Spending and Employment? A New Real-Time Economic Tracker Based on
Spending and Private Sector Data 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper
No. 27431, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3637732; Alexander Bartik, The
Targeting and Impact of Paycheck Protection Program Loans to Small Businesses
2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27623, 2020), https://ssrn.com
/abstract=3665894; Christopher Neilson et al., Information Frictions and Access
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medical and economic—have been discouraging but, if sifted
carefully and analyzed thoroughly, they may yet provide
guidance for how best to structure legal and financial
responses to future crises. And with “once-in-a-century”
recessions having hit twice in the past dozen years, we can
reasonably assume those future crises will visit
uncomfortably soon.
The federal government’s official economic response to
COVID-19 began on March 27, 2020, when the United States
Congress enacted the two-trillion-dollar Coronavirus Aid,
Relief, and Economic Security Act of 2020 (“CARES Act”). 6
That federal law and its progeny allocated $669 billion to the
Small Business Administration (SBA) to administer a new
initiative entitled the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). 7
The PPP was intended to provide forgivable low-interest
loans to small- and medium-sized businesses so that
employees of those firms could continue to receive paychecks
throughout the crisis. In two early rounds of funding—
distributing $342 billion and $179 billion, respectively—
more than a half-trillion dollars quickly coursed out of the
SBA through a network of lending institutions into nearly
five million businesses across the country by June 2020. 8
to the Paycheck Protection Program 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working
Paper No. 27624, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3665895; John Eric
Humphries et al., The Evolving Impacts of Covid-19 on Small Businesses Since
the Cares Act 2 (Cowles Found. Discussion Paper No. 2230, 2020), https://ssrn
.com/abstract=3584745; William Beggs & Thuong Harvison, Fraud and Abuse in
the PPP? Evidence from Investment Advisory Firms, J. BANKING & FIN.
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 3), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3647606;
Dimitris Papanikolaou & Lawrence Schmidt, Working Remotely and the SupplySide Impact of Covid-19 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No.
27330, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3615334; Anna Cororaton & Samuel
Rosen, Public Firm Borrowers of the U.S. Paycheck Protection Program
(manuscript at 6–13) (Our Article cites to an earlier manuscript version from May
5, 2020 of the now published piece. See 10 REV. CORP. FIN. STUD. 641, 642 (2021).),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3590913.
6. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136,
134 Stat. 281 (2020) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
7. Id. §102, 134 Stat. at 286–294; id. § 1107(a), 134 Stat. at 301–02.
8. See U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM (PPP)
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Considerable portions of that money, however, found their
way into the hands of both recipients and lenders who were
not the proposed targets of economic relief. Some recipients
were politically embarrassing beneficiaries of funds intended
to support struggling entrepreneurs.
Reality TV personality Maurice Fayne, for example,
requested and received more than $1.5 million from the PPP,
which he then used “to purchase $85,000 in jewelry,
including a Rolex Presidential watch, a diamond bracelet, a
5.73 carat diamond ring for himself, and to pay $40,000 for
child support.” 9 A Florida man, David Hines, similarly
obtained $3.9 million from the PPP, which he then used to
“purchase[] a 2020 Lamborghini Huracán sports car for
approximately $318,000.” 10 And Monty Bennett, a luxury
hotelier and major political supporter of President Trump,
received PPP loans for three of his hotel chains totaling $59
million. 11
When the Trump administration, “under pressure to
reveal which companies received [PPP] loans,” 12 disclosed
the names of recipients of loans in excess of $150,000,
commentators indulged in a bipartisan carnival of outrage at
REPORT: APPROVALS THROUGH JUNE 30, 2020, at 2 (2020), https://www.sba.gov
/sites/default/files/2020-07/PPP%20Results%20-%20Sunday%20FINAL-508.pdf
(reporting a total loan count of 4,885,388 for aggregate net dollars of
$521,483,817,756 issued by 5,461 lenders).
9. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Reality TV Personality Charged with
Bank Fraud (May 13, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/reality-tvpersonality-charged-bank-fraud.
10. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Florida Man Who Used COVID-Relief
Funds to Purchase Lamborghini Sports Car Charged in Miami Federal Court
(July 27, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/florida-man-who-used-covidrelief-funds-purchase-lamborghini-sports-car-charged-miami-federal.
11. See David McLaughlin et al., Luxury Hotel Executive Biggest Winner of
(Apr.
22,
2020,
9:11
PM),
Small-Business
Relief,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-23/luxury-hotel-executivebiggest-winner-of-small-business-relief#:~:text=A%20Dallas%20hotel%20
executive%20and,Bennett%2C%20according%20to%20regulatory%20filings.
12. Jeanna Smialek et al., Lobbyists, Law Firms and Trade Groups Took
Small-Business Loans, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020
/07/06/us/ppp-small-business-loans.html.
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the hypocrisy and opportunism of certain applicants: the Ayn
Rand Institute and Americans For Tax Reform, for instance,
eschewed their philosophies opposing governmental
“handouts” to accept PPP loans; more than one hundred law
firms accepted loans of between one and ten million dollars,
including Boies Schiller Flexner and Kasowitz Benson
Torres, the firm founded by President Trump’s long-time
personal attorney, Marc E. Kasowitz; and several businesses
connected to the president’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner,
received millions of dollars. 13
These problems attracted a great deal of ridicule, but we
conclude that much of that criticism is misguided and,
indeed, may detract from more serious problems with the
PPP. Opprobrium may better be addressed to the fact that
while poorly directed loans were approved, many smaller
businesses received nothing after the first round of loans
exhausted the PPP’s cupboard or when companies collapsed
before they could reach the PPP lifeline. 14 And, in a reprise
of the 2008 financial crisis, large banks appeared to do well
out of the crisis, pocking $24 billion in fees from issuing PPP
loans. 15
This effusion of public largesse amidst a maelstrom of

13. See id. See also Helen Coster, In Sign of the Times, Ayn Rand Institute
Approved for PPP Loan, REUTERS (July 6, 2020, 8:26 PM), https://www.reuters
.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-ppp-ayn-rand/in-sign-of-the-times-ayn-randinstitute-approved-for-ppp-loan-idUSKBN248026.
14. See Thomas Franck & Kate Rogers, Small Business Rescue Loan Program
Hits $349 Billion Limit and Is Now Out of Money, CNBC (Apr. 16, 2020, 10:38
AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/16/small-business-rescue-loan-programhits-349-billion-limit-and-is-now-out-of-money.html.
15. See David Benoit & Peter Rudegeair, Banks Could Get $24 Billion in Fees
from PPP Loans, WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2020, 11:07 AM), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/banks-could-get-24-billion-in-fees-from-ppp-loans-11594134444; Robin
Saks Frankel, Banks Made Billions on PPP Loans. Learn What They are Doing
with the Cash, FORBES (July 10, 2020, 8:51 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/advisor/2020/07/10/banks-made-billions-on-ppp-loans-learn-what-theyre-doingwith-the-cash/?sh=1177a5d07f2f (“Banks earned billions of dollars in fees from
processing over 4.5 million [PPP] loans worth more than $511 billion in the last
several months, with the largest haul going to the country’s biggest banks.”).
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deep confusion about application procedures among small
businesses 16—and the predictable failings of such an
endeavor—generated intense media scrutiny, public
criticism, and political grandstanding. 17 In Part I of this
Article, we attempt to penetrate competing claims that the
program was either an enormous failure or a great success.
To do so, we conduct a regression analysis of the state-level
quantitative data released by the SBA to determine answers
to several critical questions about the PPP.
Specifically, we consider and test the hypothesis that
PPP funds were deployed as a partisan political tool of the
Trump administration. Comparing our quantitative findings
regarding the actual disbursement of PPP loans to
accusations of partisan bias, we conclude that any political
calculation failed, despite continued rhetorical insistence
otherwise, 18 either because those who administered the
program did so with integrity or incompetence. We also
evaluate critiques that the PPP was administered in ways
that were, if not partisan, then corrupt or incompetent.
Conversely, to evaluate putative successes of the program,
we also examine whether the plan might have succeeded on
broader terms, notwithstanding specific critiques, such as by
keeping millions of Americans employed or by materially
alleviating nationwide poverty in the United States during
the pandemic. 19
16. See Neilson et al., supra note 5.
17. But compare Tim Wu, The Small-Business Aid Program Has Been a
Fiasco, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/21/opinion
/paycheck-protection-program.html?searchResultPosition=10, with David A.
Graham, The Backlash Against PPP Is Why the U.S. Can’t Have Nice Things, THE
ATLANTIC (July 7, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/pppnaming-and-shaming-is-why-we-cant-have-nice-things/613894/.
18. See President Donald Trump, Remarks by President Trump on
Supporting Our Nation’s Small Businesses Through the Paycheck Protection
Program (Apr. 28, 2020), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefingsstatements/remarks-president-trump-supporting-nations-small-businessespaycheck-protection-program/.
19. See Jonathan O’Connell et al, Following Messy Start, Enormous Paycheck
Protection Program Shows Signs of Buttressing Economy, WASH. POST (June 10,
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In Part II, we apply historical and sociological
methodologies to try to explain what went wrong with the
PPP. 20 We analyze the legislative origins of the PPP and
conduct a qualitative empirical survey of entrepreneurs who
attempted to navigate loans for their businesses in the
earliest days of the program. Their widespread struggles
owed a great deal to the lack of clear guidance about how to
apply for loans and, most saliently, whether the loans would
ultimately be forgiven. 21 Through multiple interviews with
business owners, we examine how they constructed private
ordering through group actions—in a process embedded in
Granovetterian social ties—in an attempt to compensate for
governmental shortcomings in communication about the
essential features of the program. 22 We apply further
socioeconomic theory to inspect lawmakers’ oversight in
congressional hearings with federal officials and financial
intermediaries as they grappled with technical challenges to
the disbursement of PPP funds. Finally, we explore the
structural incentives contained within the PPP’s regulatory
apparatus that encouraged banks to generate maximum fees
from larger loans—and thus privileged larger borrowers—to
the detriment of the small business owners who were the
program’s putative intended beneficiaries.
In Part III, we begin an attempt to devise a better model
for how the government can provide emergency funding
during future economic crises. To do so, we invoke the work
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/09/how-effective-is-pp
p-small-business.
20. See, e.g., Douglas Holtz-Eakin, CARES Act in Historical Perspective, AM.
ACTION F. (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.americanactionforum.org/daily-dish
/cares-act-in-historical-perspective.
21. See OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., FLASH REPORT
SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PAYCHECK
PROTECTION PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS (May 8, 2020) [hereinafter SBA INSPECTOR
GENERAL REPORT], https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/SBA_OIG_
Report_20-14_508.pdf.
ON

22. See Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The
Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. OF SOCIO. 481, 504–07 (1985).
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of Raj Chetty and scholars who have explored the financial
effects of stimulus plans and other governmental economic
interventions. 23 In recent years, economists such as Chetty
et al. have increasingly focused upon the social effects of
economic change, employing social variables such as race,
gender, and socioeconomic status to understand the effects of
social welfare policies. 24 In engaging with this work, we
consider mechanisms deployed during the global pandemic
in other countries that more successfully negotiated the
financial fallout. 25 Ultimately, we argue that the federal
government should adopt mechanisms that obviate or
diminish the participation of financial intermediaries—and
the need to pay those banks billions of dollars—in favor of
more direct networks between the national fisc and its
individual and corporate citizens. 26
In Part IV, we conclude with a call for serious and wellconsidered plans to be drafted today to create a more efficient
and effective mechanism for disbursing future economic
stimulus funds to the American public. We now know the
steep price of our failure to make such plans following the
2008 financial crisis. 27 In the future, such a tool will prove
vital whether coming political administrations anticipate
retroactively responding to new financial crises or
proactively embracing designs to distribute funds, such as
universal basic income.
23. See Chetty et al., supra note 5, at 2.
24. See id. at 4.
25. See, e.g., Jérémie Cohen-Setton & Jean Pisani-Ferry, When More Delivers
Less: Comparing the US and French COVID-19 Crisis Responses, PETERSON INST.
FOR INT’L ECON. (June 2020), https://www.piie.com/system/files/documents/pb209.pdf.
26. See Isil Erel & Jack Liebersohn, Does FinTech Substitute for Banks?
Evidence from the Paycheck Protection Program (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 27659, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27659.
27. See Nathan Stovall, Coronavirus Bailout Already Towers Over TARP,
With More to Come, S&P GLOBAL (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.spglobal.com
/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/coronavirus-bailoutalready-towers-over-tarp-with-more-to-come-57964369.
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I. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE
PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM
The fundamental inquiry for any quantitative analysis
of a massive funding initiative is an assessment of how well
the program accomplished its goals. We attempt to answer
that question, and its manifold variants, through a
statistical approach that focuses on legal and political
insights. In so doing, we contribute to a nascent but
burgeoning body of economic literature that uses
quantitative methods to assess the efficacy of the PPP. 28
Although economists may have started to examine the PPP,
their studies do not consider the program as a legal policy.
Rather, they examine the distribution of the loans, banking
infrastructure, business decisions, and the effects of the
program. While certainly useful, assessing the performance
of the program in this way takes for granted how the
program was justified, built, and administered. In
concentrating on legal issues instead, we consider how the
program unfolded in time and the potential mechanisms that
caused the distribution to look as it did. We focused our
attention on the earliest stage of the program, because we
found the data from that period had the strongest effects on
subsequent rounds of planning.
In our statistical analysis, we match publicly available
data from the SBA with other open sources of data, which

28. Several teams of economists have matched publicly available PPP data
with either: (a) proprietary data from large private businesses such as credit card
processors or payroll service firms; or (b) proprietary data obtained from the
federal government through the Freedom of Information Act. These studies are
invaluable, because they obtain micro-level data of not just PPP lending patterns,
but also business outcomes during the period in which the PPP was distributing
funds. Further, some of these studies use statistical techniques that allow them
to make preliminary causal statements about the effects of the PPP on key
program goals such as reducing unemployment. We discuss the existing state of
the economic literature in detail in below. These studies have largely concluded
that the PPP’s poor geographic targeting, the unclear terms of the loans, and the
lack of consumer spending due to the pandemic itself have mitigated the positive
effects of the program on employment. See sources cited supra note 5.
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allowed us to run regression analysis on several theories
about the design of the program posited by lay commentators
and policymakers alike. 29 Importantly, these data were also
the publicly available data that drove initial reporting on the
program and discussions in the Senate hearings that took
place in April, May, and June. 30 In several instances, our
findings confirm those of other researchers, primarily
economists. Equipped with these statistical findings, we
examine in Part II of this Article the development and
oversight of the program to explain how and why the PPP
distribution unfolded as it did.
A. Where the PPP Loans Went
Our statistical approach answers several important
questions. First, at a high level examining the distribution of
PPP loans across states, we identify where the money went.
In so doing, we are able to answer whether the PPP
distribution correlated significantly with variables
important to the enactment of the CARES Act, such as
unemployment, impact of the pandemic, small business
employment, and political voting patterns. Second, we
explore how those correlations changed over time, as the PPP
rolled out a first and then a second wave of disbursements.
We examine whether there was a significant difference in
correlations between the first and second rounds of the
program. Different outcomes, of course, may communicate
essential information about how to structure future
programs more effectively. 31

29. See infra Section I.A.
30. See generally Hearing on Implementation of Title I of the CARES Act,
Senate Committee on Small Business & Entrepreneurship (June 10, 2020),
[hereinafter Senate CARES Act Hearing], https://www.sbc.senate.gov/public
/index.cfm/hearings?ID=C0E44E40-CC47-469C-9404-BE3EB4020AA0.
31. See, e.g., Liu & Volker, supra note 5.
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1. PPP Funds Were Distributed Differently in the Two
Funding Rounds
Visualizing data geographically provides important
intuitive insights that can then be tested statistically. We
find, in Figure 1A, that lending in the first round of the PPP
appeared to favor states less impacted by the pandemic at
the time the funds were released. As data became public,
between the PPP’s first and second rounds, the program was
increasingly scrutinized and criticized by legislators, small
businesses, and business owners. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
then, we find a remarkable reversal in lending patterns
between the first and second rounds, which are plainly
visible when we map lending per private employee by state
in the first two weeks of the second round, as shown in Figure
1B below.
FIGURE 1.

PPP Lending per Private Employee by State 32

FIGURE 1A. Round 1—April 3 through April 16, 2020

32. Gradients represent four quartiles of loan amount values, with the
darkest gradient representing the highest quartile (Q1). Alaska and Hawaii are
excluded for mapping purposes only: both fall in Q1 in Round 1. In Round 2,
Alaska falls in Q2 and Hawaii in Q3.
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FIGURE 1B. Round 2—April 27 through May 8, 2020

These results suggest several possible explanations not
yet accounted for in the existing quantitative literature,
which generally consider the interactions between lenders
and borrowers rather than the design and administration of
the policy. One benign explanation is simply that many
eligible firms from fast-acting, yet less affected states, had
already applied in the first round and were therefore no
longer eligible to apply in the second round. A different
possibility, of course, is that the administrators of the PPP
adjusted their approval or targeting strategies between the
first and second rounds of the program. That is, the SBA
personnel might not simply have been passive actors in a
system in which the behavior of borrowers and lenders
determined the pattern of disbursed funds, as several papers
on the topic seem to assume implicitly. 33

33. See, e.g., Chris Gaetano, NY Fed Study Finds Most PPP Loans Issued Were
in States Least Affected by COVID-19, THE TRUSTED PRO. (May 7, 2020),
http://www.nysscpa.org/most-popular-content/ny-fed-study-finds-most-ppploans-issued-were-in-states-least-affected-by-covid-19-050720.
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We consider four primary hypotheses that might have
driven the overall pattern of lending in the first and second
rounds:
(1) loan distributions reflected the overall proportion
of small business employment in the states;
(2) loan distributions reflected the impact of
COVID-19 (as measured by infection rates) on
the state population;
(3) loan distributions reflected the political leanings
of the state; and
(4) loan distributions reflected an effort to mitigate
unemployment.
In our section on data below, we detail how we developed
each of the measures, combining data from the SBA, Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 2020 US Census, and the New York
Times GitHub data portal. In our regression results, we find
that in the first round of the program, PPP lending is
positively correlated (p < .001) with the percentage of small
business employment in a state, perhaps suggesting that in
states with more robust lending infrastructure for small
businesses, those businesses were able to secure loans more
quickly in the first come, first serve system of the program.
Most surprisingly, weak—though not statistically
significant—negative correlations existed between loan
disbursements and both COVID-19 incidence and
unemployment claims. That is, states more affected by the
virus, both economically and epidemiologically, were less
likely to receive more PPP funding. A weak (but, again, not
statistically significant) positive correlation existed between
loan disbursements and voting patterns for Donald Trump in
the 2016 presidential election.
In the second round of the program, 34 many of these
34. See Senate Approves More Time to Spend Paycheck Protection Loans, N.Y.
TIMES (June 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/03/business/stockmarket-today-coronavirus.html.
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trends reversed, as we can see in Figure 2 below. In fact, the
relationship between Round 1 and Round 2 lending was
negative and statistically significant (p < .001). Small
businesses in states with lower employment in the small
business sector were more likely to receive funding (p < .01).
States impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, economically
and epidemiologically, were likely to receive a greater
portion of funds (p < .1). The positive correlation of funds
with voting patterns for Donald Trump in 2016 also reversed
(p < .01). These changes in fortune may have been too little,
too late, however, for firms in hardest hit areas with low cash
reserves that could not receive funding earlier in the
program when funds were misguidedly flowing to states with
less urgent need.
FIGURE 2.

Round 1 vs. Round 2 Funding
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2. Outcome Variable: The Counterintuitive
Disbursement of PPP Loans
To arrive at our outcome variable, we divided the total
loan amount in each state by the number of private
employees from that state in 2019. We used the number of
private employees in each state rather than a more general
per capita measure to arrive at a value that would be more
reflective of the predominant goal of the program: to protect
private sector paychecks. In addition to the outcome variable
used in our regression, it is helpful to visualize the
disbursement of the loans based on the North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS), in Figure 3A, and
loan size in Figure 3B.
Descriptively, these two bar charts suggest some
patterns of concern for the effectiveness of the program.
First, by NAICS category, it is clear that funds were not
distributed to the industries that were the most impacted by
the virus in terms of employment. For example,
“Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services,” the
category that includes consulting firms, received far more
funding than the food and accommodations industry, which
faced a disproportionate impact of the virus. The food and
accommodations industry accounted for as much as half of
employment decline during the early stages of the pandemic,
while professional, scientific, and technical service workers
accounted for only 5% of employment decline. 35 NAICS-level
data was not initially released for the second round of the
program.
The loan-size data, in Figure 3B, seems to show a
disproportionate skew towards higher loan values, despite

35. See Chetty et al., supra note 5, at 36 (“For example, firms in the
professional, scientific, and technical services industry received a greater share
of the PPP loans than accommodation and food services (SBA 2020). Yet
accommodation and food services accounted for half of the total decline in
employment between February and March (prior to PPP enactment) in BLS
statistics, while employment in professional, scientific and technical services
accounted for less than 5% of the decline.”).
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the disproportionate number of small loan borrowers. That
is, loans greater than $150,000 (just 26% of the total number
of loans) accounted for 83% of the total value lent. 36 Further,
loans of one million dollars or greater accounted for 44.5% of
the total loan amount and, as a general matter, larger loans
went to larger firms. 37 Because the SBA did not release firmlevel data until July 2020, we have not presented that data
in this study as we are primarily considering the decision
environment in the early days of the pandemic. 38
Undoubtedly, that data will prove to be an interesting source
of evidence for calls of public accountability and must
continue to inform future research.
In the first round, the mean loan per employee for the
states was $2,941.86, with a considerable standard deviation
of $577.50 around this figure. 39 Surprisingly, the state that
initially received the highest amount of loan value per
private employee was North Dakota with $4,462.88, and the
state that received the lowest was Nevada with $1,728.26.
The very fact that North Dakota, a state much less affected
by COVID-19 at that time, received so much more in loans
than Nevada, a state heavily dependent on service sector
work, clearly reflects the lack of solution-oriented logic in the
allocation of the funds.
Second round statistics from April 27 through May 8,
2020, were used because of the comparable time window and
because the majority of second round loans were made in this
initial two-week period. Lending in fact remained open
through July. The mean loan per employee in this period for
36. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., supra note 8.
37. Id.
38. See Jonathan O’Connell et al., Faulty Data Collection Raises Questions
about Trump’s Claims on PPP Program, WASH. POST (July 14, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/07/14/ppp-job-claims-sba/.
39. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., supra note 8. See also Effects of COVID-19
Pandemic on Employment and Unemployment Statistics, BUREAU OF LAB. STATS.,
https://www.bls.gov/bls/effects-of-covid-19-pandemic-on-employment-andunemployment-statistics.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2021).
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the states was $1,221.60, less than half of the amount lent in
the first round, with a considerable standard deviation of
$482.26 around this figure, almost as high as in the previous
round. The state that received the highest amount of loan
value per private employee was California with $2,452.15,
and the state that received the lowest was Nebraska with
$580.17. Those distributions might reflect a refinement of
the policy based on coronavirus impact in the second round,
with higher amounts being channeled to states with greater
need, such as New York and New Jersey. In any event,
without targeted data on which firms received the loans, the
average numbers per private employee still suggest that
amounts would not have been large enough to keep
employees off state unemployment rolls for more than a few
weeks.
FIGURE 3.

Round 1 Lending by Sector, Size, and
Borrowers

FIGURE 3A. Lending by NAICS subsector for the PPP
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FIGURE 3B. Loan Size and Number of Borrowers

3. Possible Explanatory Variables for Loan Disbursements
a. The Incidence of Small Business Employment
The first predictor variable for loan distribution we
tested was the proportion of private employees employed in
small businesses in each state. Because the program was
designed to target employees of small businesses, this
variable was included to test the hypothesis that loans went
to states with higher rates of small business employment.
This variable was the same for both rounds, as the figures
are calculated annually, not more frequently. 40
The mean small business employment rate is 49%, about

40. Note that the definition of a small business varies by industry. For some
industries, the definition is set by a company’s number of employees and for
others by annual revenues. These standards differ widely, with an upper limit of
between 1 and 50 million dollars yearly revenues and employment upper limits
of up to 1,500 employees for some industries, though an upper limit of 500
employees was the most common.
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half of all employment, with a standard deviation around
5%. 41 Montana had the highest small business employment
rate, 65%, while Florida had the lowest small business
employment rate, 42%. 42 States with sparse and small
populations, such as Maine, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Wyoming, Vermont, and Montana, tend to have high
employment rates in small businesses. Thus, the high
relative allocation of loans to states like Montana in the first
round may have been an artifact of economic organization in
those states, which could provide richer lending resources for
small businesses.
The coefficient of the relationship between small
business employment and loan amounts is reported below in
the results section, Section I.B.3. In both the first and second
round, small business employment is positively and
significantly correlated with state loan amounts.
b. The Geographic Impact of the Coronavirus
In order to test whether the relative impact of COVID-19
by state was correlated with loan disbursement amounts, we
created a snapshot impact measure using New York Times
data of how many active cases existed in each state through
the last date the loan program was open for both rounds
(April 15 and May 8, respectively). 43 Because of a sharp right
skew, a natural log transformation was necessary to assess
the precise relationship of this variable to the outcome
variable.
On average, on April 15, 2020, 0.15% of the United
States population was considered an active Coronavirus
41. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., supra note 39.
42. Scatterplots in Figure 3A and 3B, supra, give an idea of the distribution
of small business employment by state.
43. Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, NY TIMES,
https://github.com/nytimes/covid-19-data (last visited Dec. 27, 2021); see also
generally Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, NY TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/us/covid-cases.html (last visited Dec.
27, 2021).
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case. There was, of course, considerable variation by state,
reflected in a standard deviation of 0.2%. The most impacted
state was New York with 1.1% of the population considered
an active case on April 15, 2020. The least impacted state
was Minnesota with 0.03% of the population considered an
active case.
Then, in the second round, on May 8, each state had on
average 0.35% of the population considered an active
coronavirus case, more than double the April rate. There was
considerable variation, with a standard deviation of 0.36%.
The most impacted state was again New York with 1.73% of
the population considered an active case. The least impacted
state was Montana with 0.043% of the population considered
an active case (less than one thirtieth of the rate in New
York).
The coefficient of the relationship between COVID-19
impact and loan amounts are reported below in the results
section, Section I.B.3. In the first round, loan amounts are
negatively correlated with coronavirus impact, but not
statistically significant, meaning states with less COVID-19
impact were more likely to receive loan funds. In the second
round, loan amounts are positively correlated with
COVID-19 impact (and statistically significant at the p < .01
level).
c. 2016 Presidential Election Voting Patterns
In order to assess the extent of partisan political bias in
the distribution of funds, we hypothesized that states that
voted for Donald Trump in the 2016 election—or that were
predicted to do so in 2020—might have been rewarded for
that pattern. To test the possibility that presidential politics
influenced the disbursements of loans, we created a dummy
variable to assess whether a state voting for Donald Trump
in the 2016 election was correlated with loan disbursement.
Thirty states received the dummy variable of “1” for voting
for Donald Trump in 2016, while twenty states and
Washington DC received the dummy variable “0” for voting
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for Hilary Clinton.
In several of the administration’s other COVID-19 policy
decisions, there has been considerable evidence that the
administration governs in a preferential fashion, rewarding
loyal constituents and punishing perceived enemies. 44 And,
indeed, the initial data released following the first round of
the PPP, 45 prima facie evidence suggested that this partisan
motive could have been at work, at least as demonstrated by
the geographical distribution of loans. News reports quickly
reflected this supposition. 46 In that first round, the states
that received the highest loan amounts were largely rural or
midwestern states with low infection rates. By contrast,
states like New York and California, which were
disproportionately
affected
by
the
pandemic—but
traditionally Democratic strongholds with no likelihood of
furnishing votes in the Electoral College to the Trump
reelection campaign—received far lower loan amounts.
The coefficient of the relationship between voting
patterns and loan amounts is reported below in the results
section, Section I.B.3. In the first round, having voted in
favor of Donald Trump in 2016 is positively correlated with
loan amounts. In the second round, voting for Donald Trump
is negatively correlated with loan amounts (with neither
result being statistically significant).
d. The Incidence of Unemployment Claims
Because the PPP was designed to keep citizens
employed, we tested whether the number of people applying
44. See, e.g., Matt Stieb, Trump’s Disregard for Blue States Is at the Heart of
His Shoddy Covid Response, N.Y. MAG. (July 31, 2020), https://nymag.com
/intelligencer/2020/07/trumps-war-on-blue-states-is-worse-than-previouslythought.html.
45. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., supra note 8.
46. See, e.g., Viktor Reklaitis, Democratic Congresswoman as Red States Beat
Out Blue Ones for Small Business Aid: ‘I Smell a Rat,’ MARKETWATCH (Apr. 17,
2020, 11:23 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/democratic-congress
woman-as-red-states-beat-out-blue-ones-for-small-business-aid-i-smell-a-rat2020-04-17.
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for unemployment in the two weeks leading up to the
opening of the loan application window was correlated with
the amounts of loans disbursed. This number was calculated
as a rate of new applications per private employee during the
two-week period immediately prior to the opening of the
program’s two rounds, which were the weeks ending April 11
and April 25, 2020.
In the first round of the PPP, each state had on average
8.5% of their private employees filing unemployment claims
in the two weeks before the first loan period. 47 This variable
also had considerable variation, with a standard deviation of
2.9%. Georgia had the highest rate of unemployment filings,
with 18.7% of private employees. South Dakota had the
lowest rate, with 4.1% of private employees.
These data appear to have a roughly normal distribution
with a few outlying states having higher unemployment
claim rates and the rest tightly clustered. These uneven data
could reflect different unemployment insurance policies by
state or idiosyncratic labor market structures in different
states.
In the second round of the PPP, each state had on
average 5.9% of their private employees filing
unemployment claims in the two weeks before the second
loan period opened. 48 This number is likely lower than the
previous period because many people had already lost their
jobs and applied for unemployment, 49 and this measure
includes only new filings. 50 This variable also had
47. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., supra note 39.
48. Id.
49. See Ioana Marinescu et al., Job Search, Job Posting and Unemployment
Insurance During the Covid-19 Crisis 19 (Aug. 7, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3664265.
50. See Dana Scott et al., Employment Effects of Unemployment Insurance
Generosity During the Pandemic, TOBIN CTR. FOR ECON. POL’Y, YALE UNIV., at 5
(July 14, 2020), https://tobin.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/C-19%20Articles
/CARES-UI_identification_vF(1).pdf. See also BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., supra note
39.
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considerable variation, with a standard deviation of 2.65%.
West Virginia had the highest rate of unemployment filings,
with 18.65% of private employees filing claims, while
Nebraska had the lowest rate, with 2.3% of private
employees filing claims.
The
coefficient
of
the
relationship
between
unemployment claims and loan amounts is reported below in
the results section, Section I.B.3. In the first round, new
unemployment claims in a state are negatively correlated
with loan amounts. In the second round, unemployment
claims are positively correlated with loan amounts (with
neither being statistically significant).
B. Methodology, Model & Results
1. Methodology
To test these hypotheses about how the PPP funds were
distributed, we used multiple linear regression in STATA to
test for patterns in the allocations of the funds. Again, our
four primary hypotheses were: (1) loan distributions
reflected the proportion of small business employment in the
states; (2) loan distributions reflected the impact of COVID19 on the state population; (3) loan distributions reflected the
political leanings of the state; and (4) loan distributions
reflected an effort to mitigate unemployment in the states.
The proportion of small businesses in states was
consistently the most statistically significant factor in
explaining the allocation. Allocation, however, departed
sharply from “need” based on unemployment and
coronavirus impact, especially in the first round of the policy,
echoing the findings of Granja et al. 51 In the first round of
the PPP, “Republican” states were more likely to receive
funds, but this trend reversed in the second round. Overall,
these statistics might more accurately reflect the chaotic

51. See Granja et al., supra note 5, at 3.
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nature of the policy and its implementation by the SBA,
rather than any more intentional motivations.
2. Models
We estimate the following equations using ordinary least
squares:
ROUND 1 MODEL:

In the equation for our analysis of the first round of the
PPP, β0 is not meaningful on its own but reflects the y
intercept of the regression equation. Technically, the
coefficient is the estimated per private employee loan
amount for states with no small business employment or
coronavirus impact, that voted for Hillary Clinton in the
2016 election, and had zero unemployment claims per
private employee filed in the two weeks before the loan
allocation. Then β1 is the estimated difference in state loan
allocation per private employee associated with an increase
in the small business employment ratio, holding all other
variables constant. And β2 is the estimated difference in state
loan allocation per private employee associated with an
increase of the natural log of the coronavirus impact
percentage (cases per capita times one hundred), holding all
other variables constant. The natural log of the coronavirus
impact percentage is taken due to a positive skew in the data
because of heavily impacted states like New York and New
Jersey. Next, β3 is the estimated difference in loan allocation
per private employee associated with voting for Donald
Trump in the 2016 presidential election, holding all other
variables constant. And β4 is the estimated difference in loan
allocation per private employee associated with an increase
in unemployment claims per private employee filed in the
two weeks before the loan allocation, holding all other
variables constant.
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ROUND 2 MODEL:

The Round 2 Model is identical to the Round 1 Model
with the exception of one additional coefficient, β5, reflecting
the estimated difference in loan allocation per private
employee associated with an increase in loan allocation in
the previous round, holding all other variables constant. This
variable was added to test the hypothesis that
administrators of the program redirected the allocation of
the program following a review of the first round.
3. Results
We set forth our results in Table 1 below.
TABLE 1.

Factors Associated with PPP Loans by State
PPP Loan Amounts
per Private Sector Employee
Coefficient

SE

Round 1
Small Business Employment
COVID-19 Impact
2016 Election Voting
Unemployment

76.25*
-80.59
130.39
-4.51

11.28
74.04
125.60
20.18

Round 2
Small Business Employment
COVID-19 Impact
2016 Election Voting
Unemployment
Round 1 Allocation

37.04**
115.08*
-314.99**
6.15
-0.63***

12.97
61.83
103.23
19.03
0.12

* p < 0.1
** p < 0.01
*** p < 0.001
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For the first round of program, the coefficient of 76.25 for
the Small Business Employment variable is the estimated
difference in state loan allocation dollars per private
employee associated with an increase of 1% in the small
business employment ratio, holding all other variables
constant (statistically significant relationship, p<.001.). To
illustrate, a state with 10% higher employment in small
businesses than another state would be expected to receive
about $760 more per private employee in that state. The
small business employment percentages ranged from 42% in
Florida to 65% in Montana, indicating a large possible
influence of changes in this ratio on loan outcomes. The
coefficient for COVID-19 Impact variable of -80.59 is the
estimated difference in loan allocation per private employee
associated with a 1% relative increase in the coronavirus
impact percentage (cases per capita * 100), holding all other
variables constant. For a 1% relative increase in the
COVID-19 impact percentage, we would expect to see a
decline of $80.60 in loan amount. The coefficient of 130.39 for
the 2016 Election Voting is the estimated difference in loan
allocation per private employee associated with voting for
Donald Trump in the 2016 election, holding all other
variables constant. The coefficient of -4.51 for the
Unemployment variable is the estimated difference in loan
allocation per private employee associated with a 1%
increase in unemployment claims per private employee filed
in the two weeks before the loan allocation, holding all other
variables constant.
Only one variable correlation was statistically
significant in the first round—the private employment share
of small businesses—which suggests relatively little
coherence or effectiveness in possible rationales for the
program. Still, the overall trends do show some striking
relationships. The correlation of loan amount with small
business employment was positive and statistically
significant. States with a larger percentage of small
businesses, as defined by the SBA, received more loans.
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Paradoxically, however, having a higher coronavirus impact
in a state tended to reduce the amount of loans disbursed per
private employee, reflecting a general misallocation of the
funds and assuming a main goal of the program was to
relieve the economic impact of the pandemic. These two
results suggest that businesses in states with many small
businesses, but without the chaos of an eruption of the
pandemic, were the first ones to get PPP loans. Further,
states with more unemployment claims tended to receive
fewer loans per private employee, suggesting, again, a
mismatch between the program’s distribution and the goal of
mitigating unemployment. Republican states tended to
receive about $130 more per private employee than nonRepublican states. This result is not statistically significant,
however, and the relationship may reflect underlying
differences in economic organization in these states, rather
than political bias.
In the second round of funding, many of these trends
appeared to reverse. In that round, the reversal of loan
patterns is so striking that they alone do not seem to reflect
the additional clarity provided in rules, which were released
in a series of FAQs and links of “Interim Final Rules” on the
SBA website, 52 or the exhaustion of eligible firms in highperforming states early on. Instead, the reversal was
perhaps a deliberate effort on behalf of the administration to
reallocate the distribution of loans. In the course of the first
few weeks of the program, thousands of loan processors were
hired at the SBA to handle increasing loan volume, perhaps
signaling a shift in the processing approach of at least some
of the loans. 53
52. See generally Paycheck Protection Program Loans, Frequently Asked
Questions (FAQs), TREASURY DEP’T, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136
/Paycheck-Protection-Program-Frequently-Asked-Questions.pdf (last visited
Dec. 27, 2021).
53. See Kenneth Terrell, SBA Seeks to Fill Work-from-Home Jobs to Process
Stimulus Loans, AARP (May 5, 2020), https://www.aarp.org/work/job-search
/info-2020/sba-hiring-coronavirus-stimulus-loans.html
(“To
meet
the
[coronavirus] demand, the SBA already has hired nearly 7,000 employees since
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In the second round, the coefficient of 37.04 for the Small
Business Employment variable is the estimated difference in
state loan allocation per private employee associated with an
increase of 1% in the small business employment ratio,
holding all other variables constant (statistically significant,
p < .01). The coefficient of 115.08 for the COVID-19 Impact
variable is the estimated difference in loan allocation per
private employee associated with a 1% relative increase in
the coronavirus impact percentage (cases per capita * 100),
holding all other variables constant. For a 1% relative
increase in the COVID-19 impact percentage, we would
expect to see an increase of $115.08 in loan amount. The
coefficient of -314.99 for the 2016 Election Voting variable is
the estimated difference in loan allocation per private
employee associated with voting for Donald Trump in the
2016 election, holding all other variables constant (p < .01).
The coefficient of 6.15 for the Unemployment variable is the
estimated difference in loan allocation per private employee
associated with a 1% increase in unemployment claims per
private employee filed in the two weeks before the loan
allocation, holding all other variables constant. The
coefficient of -0.63 for the Round 1 Allocation variable is the
estimated difference in loan allocation per private employee
associated with a one dollar increase in allocation in the
previous round, holding all other variables constant
(statistically significant, p < .001). Thus, the higher the loan
values received in the first round, the more likely firms in
the state were to receive lower amounts overall in the second
round.
For the second round of the PPP, which we calculate
through May 8, 2020, statistically significant results showed
striking differences from the previous round. These changes
may have been due to a redirection of the program to better
meet the needs of small businesses or simply as a response
to criticism. Loan allocation in the first round was negatively
March, and the hiring continues.”).
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associated with allocations in the second round, meaning
several of the trends in allocation must have reversed
entirely. The loan amount correlation with small business
employment in the states, however, remained positive and
statistically significant. That is, states with more small
businesses still tended to receive more PPP loans. Most
notably, in the second round, states suffering a higher
coronavirus impact, based on a measure of new infections per
capita, tended to enjoy an increase in the amount of loans
disbursed. Little evidence exists, however, to show that
unemployment claims predicted loan amounts. Finally, the
trend of allocation due to political leanings also reversed in
the second round, such that Republican states received fewer
funds per employee on the whole. Overall, we can conclude
that, at the limited resolution the SBA published their data
at the time, loans started to flow to heavily impacted states
only in the second round.
C. Critical Questions Surrounding the PPP
Having conducted our analysis of the publicly available
data surrounding PPP loans, we can now consider several of
the most critical questions surrounding a program of this
magnitude and exigency. To do so, we draw upon our own
findings, of course, but also conduct a wider examination of
other economic analyses that have been conducted to date, in
an effort to survey the state of the field.
1. Was the PPP Administered for Partisan Political
Advantage?
We considered and tested the hypothesis—entertained
widely by the chattering classes on Twitter and other social
media—that the PPP was deployed as a political tool by the
Trump administration to buttress his presidential reelection
campaign. Drawing upon our quantitative findings from the
actual disbursement of PPP loans, we conclude that any
political designs underlying the program likely failed. That
failure might have been due either to the integrity of its
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administrators or to their incompetence in advancing a
partisan agenda. In the first round of the PPP, states that
voted for Donald Trump in the 2016 election did receive, on
average, about $130 more per private employee than states
that voted for Hillary Clinton. But statistics will not prove to
be the source of any evidence of political or punitive
motivations behind the PPP disbursements.
Although the hypothesis of a politically motivated PPP
in the first round is plausible, as Republican states tended to
receive more loans per private employee, the relationship
was not statistically significant. Further, that relationship
reversed in the second round of PPP funding. Within the
nascent economic literature on the PPP, scholars have
tended not to question the motivation of the PPP program,
but instead its efficacy according to its stated objectives.
Documentary accounts of the policymaking process will have
to be investigated when they are ultimately released, in
order to evaluate the extent to which political pressure from
the executive branch shaped the design of the loans. The SBA
is, unlike the Federal Reserve, a cabinet-level agency of the
executive branch and thus far from an independent political
organ. Whether explicit political choices created distortions
within the policy itself is something future correspondence or
communiques will be needed to prove.
2. Was the PPP Administered Corruptly?
Another line of questioning related to the PPP funds is
whether the program was administered corruptly, not at the
level of government officials in the executive branch, but
rather at the level of bank lenders and borrowers free riding
on a program meant to prop up the economy during one of
the worst economic crises in American history. Although our
statistical evidence does not provide answers to this question
at its state-level resolution, the fact that the small number
of firms taking on the largest loans—those greater than one
million dollars—accounted for more than half of the total
lending does suggest problems with a program designed to

1574

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

benefit “small businesses.” 54 Further, recent examinations of
firm-level data have observed seemingly “unworthy”
borrowers, some of whom have begun to return their loans.
In the economics literature, for instance, Anna
Cororaton and Samuel Rosen have investigated the
characteristics of public firm borrowers in the PPP in an
attempt to answer some of these questions. 55 Although
certain public firm borrowers were made eligible for the PPP,
these firms have drawn considerable scrutiny in the press:
Shake Shack and Potbelly, among many others. 56
Cororaton and Rosen ran regression analyses on the 273
public firms that received $929 million in loans between
April 7 and 27, 2020. The scholars are careful to point out
that these firms received only 0.3% of the total PPP funds, a
fact that can be obscured when these public firms are
featured prominently in the news. Data on these firms were
gathered from Compustat, where Cororaton and Rosen found
that 47.3% of public firms were eligible to receive PPP funds.
Ultimately, according to their regression results, the firms
that did receive the funds—which constituted 13% of the
eligible public firms—did tend to possess characteristics
targeted by the SBA: though they were smaller in terms of
total assets, they tended to have larger numbers of
54. See Yan Wu & Vivien Ngo, Where Did the Biggest PPP Loans Go?, WALL
ST. J. (July 23, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/graphics/where-did-thebiggest-ppp-loans-go/.
55. See Cororaton & Rosen, supra note 5, at 2.
56. See Jen Wieczner, PPP: Dozens of Public Companies Kept Millions of
Dollars in Small-Business Loans, FORTUNE (July 7, 2020, 8:00 AM),
https://fortune.com/2020/07/07/ppp-loans-public-companies-small-businessessba-paycheck-protection-program/; Inti Pacheco & Theo Francis, Public
Companies Got $500 Million in Small Business Loans, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2020,
6:27 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/these-are-the-public-companies-that-gotsmall-business-loans-11587493742; Cororaton & Rosen, supra note 5, at 673 (In
an earlier verision of their published paper, app. A tbl. A1 contained a detailed
list of 273 public firms and loans amounts. ); Jonathan O’Connell et al., Public
Companies Received $1 Billion in Stimulus Funds Meant for Small Businesses,
WASH. POST (May 1, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/05
/01/sba-ppp-public-companies/.
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employees. The PPP-receiving public firms also had less
growth opportunities and less cash on hand. These firms also
tended to have outstanding debt, which may reflect more
robust banking relationships. 57
Little to no concrete evidence suggests that firms such as
these or firms connected to political associates of the current
administration received a disproportionately high share of
PPP funds. Thus, accusations that the PPP suffered from
explicit corruption are not substantiated at this time. It is
more likely that these larger and more well-connected firms
obtained access through their high general levels of social
capital (such as through privileged relationships with
lenders) and information access (through attorneys and
accountants) rather than through explicitly corrupt
channels.
3. Was the PPP Managed Incompetently?
In terms of the existing quantitative evidence, our
results and those of other scholars support a conclusion that
the PPP was mismanaged and poorly targeted in several
respects. Beyond unverifiable political influence, the
distribution of the loans on the ground reflected
contingencies that can largely be explained with theories
other than Trump’s political designs. For instance, they
might owe much to the social structure of loan making on the
ground. In interviews we conducted and news reports,
several patterns emerged regarding the award of loans.
Especially in the first round, factors such as the local
embeddedness of banks, borrowers’ experience with the
financial system, and borrowers’ existing social ties with
banks appear to have resulted in the privileging of certain
applicants over others in receiving PPP loans. Similar
patterns appear in the statistical data we collected.
Consider our finding that funds initially flowed—in
round one—to the rural or midwestern states depicted in
57. Cororaton & Rosen, supra note 5, at 2–3.
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Figure 1. Granja et al., tie this pattern to the nonparticipation of large banks in lending to small businesses. 58
According to Granja’s data, the largest four banks were
responsible for lending 36% of small business loans prior to
the PPP, but only 3% afterwards. 59 This massive shift in
lending prompted by the PPP may have been a boon for the
small banks, but it also likely put loans out of reach for many
borrowers that did not have existing relationships with
smaller lenders, such as borrowers in urban centers less
likely to encounter small community banks. Indeed, Granja
et al. argues that “exposure”—geographical proximity—to
low PPP banks (such as Wells Fargo, JP Morgan Chase,
Bank of America, and Citibank) correlated tightly with low
PPP lending for borrowers.
That pattern, which corresponds to the geographic
pattern we present in Figure 1A and the correlation we found
between lending and state small business employment
percentage, suggests that further investigation is needed to
determine why large banks were not able to meet the needs
of small businesses. Based on anecdotal evidence, it seems
that larger banks prioritized larger clients that had
privileged access to lenders. Further, we must question why
certain geographical areas were favored based on a more
robust small banking infrastructure in the first place, a
question outside the scope of this Article but one that has
been asked by rural sociologists. 60 It is likely that the
intermediation of the program by the banking system writ
large led to distortions in which loans did not make their way
to the businesses most impacted by the pandemic, at least in
the program’s early stages. Whether this flaw was a result of
incompetence or deliberate design will need to be
investigated if documentation of the policy design process is
58. See Granja et al., supra note 5.
59. See id. at 1.
60. See generally Charles M. Tolbert et al., Restructuring of the Financial
Industry: The Disappearance of Locally Owned Traditional Financial Services in
Rural America, 79 RURAL SOCIO. 355 (2014).
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ever released. Ultimately, Granja et al. present preliminary
evidence from Homebase, a payroll and scheduling software
for the retail and foodservice sector, that shows that even
among successful PPP borrowers, PPP funds have not been
used to prop up local economic activity but rather to build up
firm savings and meet other loan commitments.
According to Neilson et al., who draw on a social mediabased survey of 14,000 small business owners in the United
States, information frictions and the “ﬁrst-come, ﬁrstserved” design of the program resulted in larger firms
receiving disproportionate resources which may have
“permanently reduced its eﬀectiveness.” 61 Our interview
data presented in Part II help shed light on the particular
character of these information frictions that may have biased
against lending to the smallest businesses.
Their questionnaire results showed that the smallest
businesses, those with fewer than ten full-time employees,
were both less aware of the PPP and about 20% less likely to
apply than businesses with between ten and fifty employees.
Further, “the smallest businesses applied later, faced longer
processing times, and were less likely to have their
application approved.” 62 Compounding these effects, the
businesses that did receive PPP loans in the survey sample
did achieve better outcomes: they were more likely to report
fewer layoffs, have higher employment and report improved
expectations about the future.
4. Did the Disbursement of PPP Loans Demonstrate a
Racial Bias?
Media outlets widely reported findings that minority
owned businesses were disproportionately affected by the
COVID-19 pandemic and faced barriers to accessing the
PPP. 63 These reports had particular resonance in Senate
61. See Neilson et al., supra note 5, at 2.
62. Id.
63. See Imani Moise, Predominately Black Congressional Districts Got Fewer
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committee meetings, where racial disparities in the economic
effects of the pandemic were discussed. 64 UCSB economist
Robert Fairlie has largely corroborated these concerns using
data from the US Current Population Survey. For instance,
he reports the following conclusions:
The number of active business owners in the United States
plummeted by 3.3 million or 22 percent over the crucial two-month
window from February to April 2020. The drop in business owners
was the largest on record, and losses were felt across nearly all
industries and even for incorporated businesses. African-American
businesses were hit especially hard, experiencing a 41 percent drop.
Latinx business owners fell by 32 percent, and Asian business
owners dropped by 26 percent. Simulations indicate that industry
compositions partly placed these groups at a higher risk of losses.
Female-owned businesses were also disproportionately hit by 25
percent. 65

On the question of racial bias, several plausible reasons
might explain why minority owned businesses faced
particular challenges in the early days of the COVID-19
pandemic, including reduced access to the PPP because of
historic lending patterns that disfavor minority-owned
businesses. 66 Fairlie, however, chose to focus his study on the
industry composition of businesses owned by minority
entrepreneurs, 67 using simulations to quantify the fact that
female, black, Latinx, 68 and Asian businesses were
PPP Loans: Study, REUTERS (July 30, 2020, 8:06 AM), https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-health-coronavirus-ppp/predominately-black-congressional-districtsgot-fewer-ppp-loans-study-idUSKCN24V24B.
64. Senate CARES Act Hearing, supra note 30.
65. See Robert W. Fairlie, The Impact of Covid-19 on Small Business Owners:
Evidence of Early-State Losses from the April 2020 Current Population Survey
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27309, 2020),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w27309/w27309.pdf.
66. See Amara Omeokwe, Black-Owned Businesses Hit Especially Hard by
Coronavirus Pandemic, Study Finds, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2020, 12:32 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/black-owned-businesses-hit-especially-hard-bycoronavirus-pandemic-study-finds-11596558754.
67. Fairlie, supra note 65, at 7–8.
68. See Inti Pacheco, Latino Business Owners Hit Hard During Pandemic,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2020, 7:22 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/latino-
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disproportionately concentrated in industries hit hard by the
pandemic. For example, 66% of businesses owned by black
business owners are considered “essential” while 76% of
businesses nationally are considered essential. This
discrepancy meant that nonessential business shutdowns
adversely affected black business owners. Similarly, only
61% of female-owned businesses are considered essential. 69
5. Was the PPP Effective at Supporting Payrolls?
Not all questions surrounding the PPP are inherently
critical. Indeed, some observers posited that the program had
been quite successful. 70 On that front, we primarily conclude
that there is mixed evidence that the first round program
was “successful” according to its own stated objectives of
alleviating pandemic-related unemployment among small
businesses. The program issued on average about five weeks’
worth of payroll to firms, as measured per employee in the
private sector by state. The money did not go to the states
that “needed” it most based on coronavirus impact at the
time, but it did go to states with higher relative levels of
small business employment. We did not find statistically
significant evidence that the program favored Republican
states, though those states did appear to receive slightly
more funds on average, likely due to the structure of the
economy in those states. Overall, the picture we found was of
a program designed to get funds “out the door” but without a
clear goal or logic.
According to our reading of other early quantitative
literature, the results are mixed. PPP loans may have helped
small business that received them with liquidity, but it is not
clear these funds were channeled into payroll at a level
visible in statistical findings. Studies by Granja et al., 71
business-owners-hit-hard-during-pandemic-11596493322.
69. Fairlie, supra note 65, at 8.
70. O’Connell et al., supra note 19.
71. See Granja et al., supra note 5, at 3–4.
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Autor et al., 72 and Chetty et al. 73 are particularly useful in
answering this question, because they each draw on similar
research designs to make causal statements about microlevel data.
First, studies such as one by Granja et al. have begun to
lay the groundwork for assessing whether the PPP loans
“paid off” by matching PPP disbursement with employment
micro-data. Their results about the distribution of PPP loans
largely confirm our initial quantitative findings. Granja et
al. found that there was not a significant effect on
unemployment claims in the initial weeks of the program.
While confidence intervals cannot rule out moderate effects
of the program, they find that the PPP did not have a large
effect on unemployment.
Granja et al.’s findings, which use proprietary data from
the SBA at the congressional district level and sophisticated
variable controls to isolate effects of the PPP loans, also show
that the PPP did not alleviate unemployment claims. 74 These
findings corroborate our state-level observation that showed
a general lack of relationship between lending and
unemployment figures.
Finally, Granja et al. uses US Census Small Business
Pulse Survey data to argue that many firms did not use PPP
funds on payroll, as intended, but instead on building up
liquidity. 75 While such a result could have medium-run
effects on the survival of the firms, this behavior does not
support short-run employment and, for firms that would
have been fine without the loans, provides further evidence
that the loans did not hit their intended target.
Granja et al.’s Freedom of Information Act confidential
data from the SBA, however, contained only information

72. See Autor et al., supra note 5, at 25.
73. See Chetty et al., supra note 5, at 34–35.
74. See Granja et al., supra note 5, at 24, 39, 94, 98.
75. See id. at 39–41.
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through April 15, 2020. So, Granja et al. are unable to show
the drastic change in lending that we argue took place in the
second round of the program, which began on April 27.
Chetty et al. use aggregated data from many private
sources—such as credit card and payroll processing—and a
difference-in-difference research design which allows them
to make causal statements about firms on the threshold of
eligibility of 500 employees. Although this design limits
insights to the largest firms that participated in the PPP, it
does allow the study to draw causal interpretation.
Nevertheless, Chetty et al. finds that payroll declines during
the pandemic may be stable across firm size, from 5 to 30,000
employees, at -36% to -39%, suggesting results from firms
around the 500-employee threshold have some level of
generalizability for both larger and smaller firms. Their
results show no significant impact on employment rates due
to PPP lending. 76
In contrast to Chetty et al., Autor et al. found a modest
effect of PPP on employment using very similar differencein-difference methods. According to their analysis, the PPP
increased employment at eligible firms by 2 to 4.5%. 77 This
modest increase may have been an inefficient outcome
considering their calculation of the dear price of the
program—between $162,000 and $381,000 per job
supported. 78 Autor et al., however, also point out that slight
differences in data sources and standard errors could
entirely explain the differences between their findings and
Chetty et al.’s. 79

76. See Chetty et al., supra note 5, at 32–33.
77. See Autor et al., supra note 5, at 3, 24.
78. See id. at 24–25.
79. See id. at 5–6.
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6. Did the PPP Alleviate Poverty?
While the PPP generally had a very limited effect on
employment, it is still too early to say definitively whether
the program alleviated poverty or had other long-term effects
on the economy, though early indications suggest a positive
impact. 80 Certainly, the additional liquidity in the American
economy may have provided lasting benefits for the firms
that received it.
According to the findings of Granja et al., benefits from
the PPP to firms outside of supporting payroll might have
occurred through three possible channels. First, firms that
received PPP benefits could have continued to operate as
they did prior to receiving funds, accruing benefits to the
owners and substituting forgivable loans for traditional
lending. Second, firms might simply have strengthened
balance sheets during shelter in place, suggesting potential
medium-term benefits due to a stronger financial position.
Finally, some firms may have actually tried to call back
workers, but this result may not have been observed due to
employees preferring unemployment insurance. 81
When considering poverty writ large, outside of the PPP,
Chetty et al. found an important result related to consumer
spending. 82 High-income individuals reduced spending much
more than low-income individuals during the pandemic,
resulting in a disproportionate impact on income and
employment for low-income employees working in affluent
areas. In that case, payments to households through
unemployment insurance would have been a more effective
stimulus tool, inasmuch as health concerns were the real
limitation in attempting to stimulate demand and get people
back to work.
80. See Jason DeParle, Pandemic Aid Programs Spur a Record Drop in
Poverty, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/28/us
/politics/covid-poverty-aid-programs.html.
81. See Granja et al., supra note 5, at 33.
82. See Chetty et al., supra note 5, at 2–6.
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7. Did the PPP Prevent Long-Term Damage to the US
Economy?
This question is, of course, still too early to answer and
lies beyond the strict scope of the data available for our
analysis. The study by Chetty et al., however, led them to
conclude that “the only effective approach to mitigating
economic hardship in the short run may be to provide
benefits to those who have lost their incomes to mitigate
consumption losses while public health measures restore
consumer confidence and ultimately increase spending.” 83
Longer-term benefits from the PPP are possible, though the
limited scale of the program in the face of continued economic
slowdown may limit the magnitude of those long-term
benefits. Cororaton and Rosen found that PPP borrowers
could potentially allocate up to $20,319 per employee with
the program. 84 Similarly, in studying more subjective
evidence, Humphries et al. found that business owners who
received PPP loans reported more optimistic expectations
about the future, about a 10% higher stated probability of
recovery in the next two years and 10% decrease in stated
probability of bankruptcy in the next six months. 85
Bartik et al. found that states receiving higher rates of
PPP loans showed milder unemployment troughs,
suggesting some prophylactic effect of PPP loans. 86 As we
pointed out earlier, however, it is not clear whether the
distribution of loans to less-affected states could be
confounding this relationship. Finally, Bartik et al. do report
a “cleansing effect” of the PPP due to banks preferring
healthier firms in lending and cash-poor firms not surviving
long enough to receive funds at all. 87 This more cynical

83. See id. at 34.
84. See Cororaton & Rosen, supra note 5, at 3.
85. Humphries et al., supra note 5, at 6.
86. Bartik et al., Measuring the Labor Market at the Onset of the COVID-19
Crisis, supra note 5, at 16.
87. See id. at 19.
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conclusion by Bartik et al. is unclear, however: it suggests
that surviving the pandemic economically might have been a
matter of evolutionary “success,” whereas the objective of the
program was to support employment and not to facilitate a
competition in which only the strong firms survive.
II. A SOCIOECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE PAYCHECK
PROTECTION PROGRAM
Like so much else in the time of COVID-19, the PPP
spread from nascent idea to ubiquitous phenomenon in
dramatically little time. 88 This explosive transmission of
lending activity was the federal government’s primary
attempt to respond legislatively to a medically induced
financial emergency. In the absence of a carefully tested plan
for such an intervention, however, Congress and the SBA
cobbled together several components of the PPP from scratch
under extreme time pressure. 89 Predictably, many intended
beneficiaries struggled mightily to navigate the ad hoc loan
process to avail themselves of proffered funds, and even
governmental officials toiled to administer the program
effectively in its first few weeks. Perhaps the only entities to
thrive in those confused early days were the financial
intermediaries—national and regional banks primarily—
that originated loans from the SBA to PPP lenders and
earned tens of billions of dollars doing so. 90

88. Holtz-Eakin, supra note 20.
89. David T. Zaring, The Government’s Economic Response to the COVID
Crisis 2 (July 28, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=3662049; Michael S. Barr et al., The Financial Response to the COVID-19
Pandemic 9 (Univ. of Mich. L. & Econ., Research Paper No. 20-040, Aug. 1, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3666461.
90. See sources cited supra note 15; see also Press Release, Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Takes Additional Actions to Provide up to
$2.3 Trillion in Loans to Support the Economy (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.federal
reserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200409a.htm.
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A. The Political History of the PPP
The most striking characteristic of the financial fall-out
from COVID-19 was its astonishing debut. A Trump
administration that had resolutely denied the initial
presence and impact of the virus performed an abrupt volteface to enact one of America’s largest financial responses in
history, a two-trillion-dollar stimulus package. 91 On March
9, 2020, when the United States reported 605 confirmed
cases of the coronavirus and twenty-two deaths, 92 President
Trump attempted to reassure Republican senators: “We’re
prepared, and we’re doing a great job with it [the virus]. And
it will go away. Just stay calm. It will go away.” 93 Just a
fortnight later, on March 27, 2020, Trump was signing the
CARES Act into law. 94 One week after that, loans began
emanating from the SBA. 95
Democrats in the House had introduced and, indeed,
voted for the origins of this bill nine months earlier. 96 How
did Republican legislators, who had ignored that earlier bill,
then so quickly change from repudiating governmental

91. Jack Brewster, Trump Signs $2 Trillion Coronavirus Relief Bill into Law,
Largest Aid Package in U.S. History, FORBES (Mar. 27, 2020, 4:36 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackbrewster/2020/03/27/trump-signs-2-trillionstimulus-bill-into-law-largest-aid-package-in-us-history/.
92. Harry Stevens & Shelly Tan, From “It’s Going to Disappear” to ‘WE WILL
WIN THIS WAR,’ WASH. POST (March 31, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/graphics/2020/politics/trump-coronavirus-statements/.
93. President Donald Trump, Remarks by President Trump After Meeting
with Republican Senators (March 10, 2020), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives
.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-meeting-republicansenators-2/.
94. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136,
134 Stat. 281 (2020) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
95. Press Release, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., SBA’s Paycheck Protection
Program for Small Businesses Affected by the Coronavirus Pandemic Launches
(Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.sba.gov/article/2020/apr/03/sbas-paycheck-protection
-program-small-businesses-affected-coronavirus-pandemic-launches.
96. See Middle Class Health Benefits Tax Repeal Act of 2019, H.R. 748, 116th
Cong. (2019) (originally passed in the House, July 17, 2019).
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bailouts to embrace government largesse on an
unprecedented scale? March 2020 was filled with several
grim milestones that made the severity of the virus
impossible to ignore, including the widespread cancellation
of schooling, a plummeting stock market, and in the week
ending March 21 unemployment filings of 3.3 million, a
figure “nearly five times” the previous record set almost forty
years before. 97
1. Small Businesses and the PPP
Just a dozen years before, government officials had
triaged another great financial crisis born of the subprime
mortgage collapse in 2008. 98 Yet legislators were unable or
unwilling to adopt many of the lessons of that Great
Recession. First, the crisis in 2008 was deemed a systemic
financial problem, while the 2020 crisis was borne of a public
health emergency. 99 In the 2008 recession, the Obama
administration considered the possibility of bailing out home
mortgage holders directly—which might have more closely
resembled the current governmental interventions—but
chose instead to provide direct financial support to mortgage
lenders and systemically important financial institutions
deemed too big to fail. Commentators on both the left and the
right criticized the 2008 response 100 and, with the exception
of a variety of liquidity facilities, 101 the 2020 response via the
PPP owes little to that precedent.
97. Jim Zarroli, 3.3 Million File Unemployment Claims, Shattering Records,
NPR (Mar. 26, 2020, 12:02 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/26/821580191
/unemployment-claims-expected-to-shatter-records.
98. Stovall, supra note 27.
99. See PAULSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 23–24; TOOZE, supra note 3, at 6; ALAN
BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED 5–6 (2013); AARON ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO
FAIL 3–4 (2009).
100. PAULSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 80; see BLINDER, supra note 99, at 181.
101. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., REPORT ON OUTSTANDING
LENDING FACILITIES AUTHORIZED BY THE BOARD UNDER SECTION 13(3) OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE ACT 3–4 (July 31, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov
/publications/files/pdcf-mmlf-pmccf-smccf-talf-ppplf-mslp-20200803.pdf.
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Instead, politicians and media outlets quickly defined
this economic crisis in their narratives as primarily a
problem of the nation’s small businesses. 102 Rather than an
issue of perturbations throughout the macroeconomy,
millions of the nation’s “mom and pop” businesses—not its
banks nor its largest industrial concerns—were the ones
deemed, collectively, “too big to fail.” 103 But though the social
imaginary of the small business was critical to the
overarching policy of the PPP, details of the program belied
the centrality of small businesses, as many of the PPP’s
critical mechanisms deferred instead to the centrality of
orthodox financial intermediaries. 104
So, for instance, small businesses would not receive PPP
loans directly from the SBA; rather, they were obliged to
apply to conventional banks and similar financial
institutions for the loans, which would then be underwritten
by the SBA. 105 The Small Business Administration, in sum,
declined to deal directly with small businesses. As we shall
see, that intermediation caused extreme difficulties for some
entrepreneurs who struggled to navigate the PPP and to
correct errors committed on their loans by the lenders acting
as their intermediaries.
Once the PPP became operational in early April 2020,
the program resembled a wind tunnel “money machine,”

102. Jim Zarroli, Even the Los Angeles Lakers Got a PPP Small Business Loan,
NPR (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020
/04/27/846024717/even-the-la-lakers-gota-ppp-small-business-loan.
103. See President Donald Trump, Remarks by President Trump on
Supporting Our Nation’s Small Businesses Through the Paycheck Protection
Program (Apr. 28, 2020), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefingsstatements/remarks-president-trump-supporting-nations-small-businessespaycheck-protection-program/; Senate CARES Act Hearing, supra note 30.
104. See CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES 23–24 (2004);
BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 15 (1983).
105. TREASURY DEP’T, supra note 52; AnnaMaria Andriotis et. al, What’s in the
$2 Trillion Senate Coronavirus Bill, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.wsj
.com/articles/whats-in-the-2-trillion-senate-coronavirus-bill-11585185450.
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with swirling piles of cash available to anyone canny enough
to grab it amidst the maelstrom. 106 In just two weeks, a
massive amount of governmental financial intervention
squeezed through a narrow temporal window. 107 In contrast
to the virus’s nanoscale and America’s dilatory appreciation
of its risk, the scale of the economic response to the pandemic
exceeded—by many orders of magnitude—the institutional
capacity of the federal government.
2. The Design and Scale of the PPP
To appreciate the scale of the PPP, consider a more
typical year for the operations of the SBA. In 2019, as the
most recent comparator, the SBA allocated around $30
billion worth of loans. 108 By contrast, the SBA allocated $342
billion in PPP loans just between April 3 and April 15,
2020. 109 When this first round of PPP loan applications
closed on April 15, the Administrator of the SBA Jovita
Carranza and Secretary of the Treasury Steve Mnuchin
issued a joint statement crafted for media headlines: “The
SBA processed more than 14 years’ worth of loans in less
than 14 days.” 110
Cramming such an enormous volume of lending into
such a tight window was always going to strain the
successful execution of this massive, impromptu program.
Indeed, the PPP began experiencing challenges even earlier,
106. Jeanna Smialek, How the Fed’s Magic Money Machine Will Turn $454
Billion into $4 Trillion, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com
/2020/03/26/business/economy/fed-coronavirus-stimulus.html.
107. See U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM (PPP)
REPORT: APPROVALS THROUGH 12 PM EST 4/16/2020, at 2 (2020),
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/SBA%20PPP%20Loan%20Report%20
Deck.pdf.
BUS.
ADMIN.
AGENCY
FIN.
REP.
1
(2019),
108. See
SMALL
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2019-12/SBA_FY_2019_AFR-508.pdf.
109. See U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., supra note 107.
110. Press Release, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Statement from Sec’y Steven T.
Mnuchin and Adm’r Jovita Carranza on the Success of the Paycheck Protection
Program (Apr. 17, 2020), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm983.
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at its conceptual stage. Despite a seeming consensus in
anecdotes relayed by congressional representatives, the
definition of what constituted “small” and “large” in an
economy like that of the United States is far from clear. 111 In
fact, even a suitable metric is unclear: Is the size of a
business best measured in terms of revenues, profits, assets,
or some other number on a balance sheet? Or perhaps its
overall market valuation? None of the above, as it turned out.
In its ordinary operations, the SBA uses a definition of
“small business” that turns on the number of employees and
the status of its securities: respectively, fewer than 500 and
private (not publicly traded). 112 The SBA’s definition of a
small business can then be relaxed to include larger
businesses depending on the industry. These standards
differ widely, with an upper limit of up to fifty million dollars
in yearly revenues and employment limits up to 1,500
employees. 113
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the time constraints for
providing relief quickly, the SBA’s pre-existing, employmentbased definition was adopted for the PPP. 114 That definition
suffered
from
dramatic
over-inclusiveness:
many
extraordinarily wealthy and powerful firms, for example,
operate with few employees and equity shares that trade
privately. Further, lockdown mandates early on were
unlikely to affect employment at firms whose employees
were able to work from home. Private equity funds and hedge
111. See Emily Stewart, The PPP Worked How it was Supposed to. That’s the
Problem., VOX (Jul. 13, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/7/13
/21320179/ppp-loans-sba-paycheck-protection-program-polling-kanye-west.
112. See 13 C.F.R. § 121 (2020).
113. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116136, § 1102, 134 Stat. 281, (2020) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
U.S.C.); 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(D).
114. See PPP Borrower Application Form, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN.,
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/PPP%20Borrower%20Applicat
ion%20Form.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20211227195043/https://www.sba.
gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/PPP%20Borrower%20Application%20Form.pdf]
(last visited Dec. 27, 2021).
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funds, as just two examples, typically employ fewer than a
few dozen professionals and scrupulously avoid public status
through a number of regulatory exceptions to US securities
regulations such as the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and the Investment Company Act of
1940. 115 But these high-finance investment funds were
hardly the mom-and-pop outfits desperate for governmental
assistance. Hedge and private equity funds were not
specifically excluded from the PPP until April 28, more than
a week after the close of the first round, when the Treasury
Department issued an Interim Final Rule expressly
disqualifying them. 116
To evaluate the actual size and scope of the PPP and the
loans it issued, we have analyzed data released by the SBA
in a previous section, Section I.B.3. As many Senators
complained bitterly in oversight hearings, 117 the earliest
data released publicly by the SBA had extremely poor
resolution: data on individual firms and their loans were not
disclosed for several months and then only for the biggest
loan values. 118 Accordingly, our statistics are similarly
constrained. Nevertheless, they do produce interesting
findings on the state level that reveal the contours of the
PPP’s general structure and the political decision
environment of the initial months of the pandemic.
115. These funds are typically structured to avoid registration under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1933 by refraining from issuing their shares through
an initial public offering and limiting the shares to fewer than 2,000
shareholders; and under the Investment Company Act of 1940 by offering their
shares to fewer than 100 investors or only to “accredited investors.” See JAMES
COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS (Wolters Kluwer 9th
ed. 2020).
116. See Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection
Program—Requirements—Promissory Notes, Authorizations, Affiliation, and
Eligibility, 85 Fed. Reg. 23,450, 23,451 (Apr. 28, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R.
pts. 120 and 121).
117. See generally Senate CARES Act Hearing, supra note 30.
118. See Courtney Weaver, Treasury Agrees to Release Names of Most Paycheck
Protection Program Borrowers, FIN. TIMES (June 19, 2020), https://www.ft.com
/content/23ad5fa2-0d7e-4f82-b8ab-4ed1da6b7659.
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In the first round, the average loan amount per private
employee for the states was $2,941.86, with considerable
variation around this number. 119 If indeed the goal of the
program was to keep employees off unemployment
insurance, which itself has been supplemented during the
pandemic with a bonus of $600 per week, these PPP amounts
were hardly adequate. The program, intended to be drawn
on just once by firms, provided just about one month’s worth
of payroll funds, bearing in mind that firms were initially
obligated to spend 75% of their loan on payroll costs, which
was later dropped to 60%. 120 As we now know, many small
businesses had to operate at diminished capacity, and with
diminished revenues due to lockdowns, for far more than
four weeks. 121
Yet statistics, alone, do not explain how this difference
materialized. Furthermore, the state-level averages obscure
considerable variation among the entire eligible pool of
applications. The reality is that many eligible firms likely did
not apply, and many firms that received loans likely received
much higher amounts per employee than the per capita
average. To understand the actual impact of the program, we
expanded our investigation beyond SBA statistics to those
businesspeople who attempted to navigate the PPP.
B. Deployment of the Program
A gulf always exists, of course, between the intention of
a law’s makers and the experience of a law’s subjects.
Because of the urgency with which the PPP was
119. See supra Section I.A.2.
120. Peter Whoriskey, PPP Was Intended to Keep Employees on the Payroll.
Workers at Some Big Companies Have Yet to Be Rehired., WASH. POST (July 27,
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/07/27/ppp-was-intendedkeep-employees-payroll-workers-some-big-companies-have-yet-be-rehired/.
121. See, e.g., Danielle Kurtzleben et al., Here’s How The Small Business Loan
Program Went Wrong in Just 4 Weeks, NPR (Mar 4, 2020, 11:14 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/05/04/848389343/how-did-the-small-business-loanprogram-have-so-many-problems-in-just-4-weeks.
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promulgated, the gap in this case turned out to be
extraordinary. To understand the initial impact of the
program, we consider three constituencies comprising the
key players in the rollout of the PPP: businesspeople who
applied for the loans, governmental officials who
administered the program’s funds, and financial
intermediaries who brokered loans between businesses and
the government for a fee. Our study of these groups suggests
that small business owners and governmental officials
struggled to deal with the early chaos of the program, but the
banks navigated the situation to their considerable profit.
Those differing outcomes have much to do with both the
relative experience of the participants with America’s legal
and financial infrastructure as well as the specific design of
the PPP’s lending program, which created conflicting
incentives.
1. Confusion for Business Owners
We begin with participants who attempted to navigate
the PPP on the ground. Our interviews with multiple
business owners—restaurateurs, primarily, and a certified
public accountant 122—reveal that they struggled to process
complex medical and financial regulations, much of which
came at them quickly and without adequate explanation or
coordination. 123 We found that, to cope with that burden,
they relied upon private ordering constructed through
Granovetterian embeddedness in social ties to compensate
for the government’s absence. 124
Mark Granovetter, of course, pioneered the concept of
“embeddedness” in economic sociology in an attempt to
enrich an under socialized concept of economic action
122. Interviews transcripts, notes, and summaries on file with the authors.
123. See Mark Niquette & Jason Grotto, Small Firms Join Rush to Return
Bailouts After Rules Revision, FIN. ADVISOR (May 11, 2020), https://www.famag.com/news/small-firms-join-rush-to-return-bailoutsafter-rules-revisions55656.html?section=3.
124. See Granovetter, supra note 22, at 481.
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longstanding in neoclassical economic models. 125 That is,
Granovetter argued against an atomistic view of humans
and frictionless markets in rational actor theories by
emphasizing the position of economic actors in social
structures. 126 Specifically, Granovetter was interested in
network analysis—the study of social ties 127—and how
economic information circulates within patterns of strong
and weak ties. In the economic context, Granovetter
emphasized the importance of enduring networks of often
reciprocal information sharing that exhibited properties
uncharacterizable as either markets or hierarchies. 128
Indeed, many seemingly open markets are highly ordered
series of interpersonal relations. Since Granovetter
published his theory in 1973, it has become one of the mostcited works in the social sciences. 129 In the case of the PPP,
information about successfully navigating the program
initially circulated only in networks of privileged borrowers
embedded via personal ties in relations with either lenders
or other legal or financial professionals.
The lack of clarity surrounding the precise terms of the
loans was the PPP’s original sin. Without knowing whether
or under what circumstances these loans would be forgiven,
borrowers faced an excruciating decision: take on large
amounts of debt that might cripple their firms over the long
run or forgo a financial lifeline and risk losing their business
immediately. Information, of course, was only one critical
variable to be juggled by business owners. One of our
subjects, a Texan restaurateur deciding whether to apply for
a two-million-dollar loan, found himself in a position in
125. See id. at 481–82.
126. See id. at 482–83.
127. Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOCIO. 1360,
1360 (1973).
128. See id. at 1361.
129. See Stanford Scholars Among the Most Cited, STANFORD NEWS (Oct. 13,
2014, 5:00 PM), https://news.stanford.edu/thedish/2014/10/13/stanford-scholarsamong-the-most-cited/.
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which obtaining the loan was less a matter of making the
“correct” or “rational” business decision as it was of being in
the right social position at the right time. 130 In this section,
we explore the perspective of business owners during the
first few weeks of the PPP.
To summarize the findings of our interviews with the
restaurateurs, we observed a number of common challenges
as well as a few idiosyncratic variations. All of the
restaurateurs, for instance, did receive PPP loans, though
none was successful in the first round. In those early days,
they all struggled to educate themselves and to submit loan
applications in a morass of urgent confusion, and they each
worried about being able to satisfy the requirement that 75%
of the loan be allocated to payroll: a huge challenge at a time
when many employees were already furloughed or
terminated and when unemployment benefits, enhanced by
other governmental payments to remediate COVID-19, were
more generous than typical paychecks. 131 All the
restaurateurs also worried greatly about whether the loans
would actually be forgiven, an issue that was unclear at the
program’s outset. The loans themselves were also a point of
divergence: one owner successfully applied for more than two
million dollars, while another received just $23,000, a
fraction of the amount for which she applied but enough to
disqualify her from successive applications. 132
As these individuals attempted to organize a coherent
orientation toward the program and a plan of action, they
generally acted embedded within social ties in four ways.
Their first reaction was often to reach for ties with banks,
which had been deputized by the SBA to process PPP loan
applications. Yet, as was widely reported in the news and

130. See interviews transcripts, notes, and summaries on file with the authors.
131. See Dimitris Papanikolaou & Lawrence D. W. Schmidt, Working Remotely
and the Supply-Side Impact of Covid-19 4 (July 27, 2020), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3615334.
132. Interviews transcripts, notes, and summaries on file with the authors.
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strongly reflected in our interviews, many small business
owners lack personal social ties with the largest banks. 133
The banks, for their part, were either reluctant to participate
in such an uncertain program or chose to prioritize their
wealthiest clients. At small banks, ties were more
productive: several local and regional banks embraced the
entrepreneurial opportunity created by the PPP to navigate
the program’s rules and paperwork and then to service small
businesses directly. 134
Second, business owners actively engaged their
professional networks of horizontal ties to other firms in
similar commercial fields. As institutional actors, they
attempted to orient themselves to other actors in similar
circumstances. Locally, businesses communicated with and
observed one another, and then modified their own
approaches based on what they were learning about the
positive and negative experiences of their peers. 135 In this
133. See Emma Coleman Jordan & Jamillah Bowman Williams, Opinion,
Surprise, Surprise. Big Bank Racism is Corrupting PPP Loans, L.A. TIMES (July
17, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-07-17/bankspandemic-small-business-racism (“Countless small businesses, which didn’t have
this advantage [prior relationships with banks], were shut out of the first round
of PPP.”); see Stewart, supra note 111 (“Many banks approving PPP loans
accepted applications only from existing customers as a default. That left out
many minority-owned businesses, which often have weak relationships with
banks as a result of years of systemic exclusion.”).
134. See, e.g., Stacy Cowley, The Tiny Bank That Got Pandemic Aid to 100,000
Small Businesses, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06
/23/business/paycheck-protection-program-cross-river-bank.html (“Cross River
[Bank of Fort Lee, NJ] has churned out loans to more than 106,000 businesses
through the Paycheck Protection Program, a centerpiece of the government’s $2
trillion CARES Act. That puts it just behind three of the country’s most prolific
lenders: Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase and Wells Fargo.”).
135. See, e.g., Interviews transcripts, notes, and summaries on file with the
authors; see also Geri Stengel, Black Women Entrepreneurs Need Support to Keep
Their Communities Strong, FORBES (Aug. 10, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www
.forbes.com/sites/geristengel/2020/08/10/black-women-entrepreneurs-needsupport-to-keep-black-communities-strong/#7256cbe539c7 (“Data from the
application for Hello Alice’s Covid-19 Business for All Emergency Grant program
finds that 36% of Black entrepreneurs report having difficulty securing funding.
Alice provides guides, resources, and collaborative communities of fellow
entrepreneurs.”).
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endeavor, industry communications—such as listservs,
email chains, and local websites 136—were particularly
important. Restaurateurs in Chicago, for instance,
communicated extensively with one another to describe how
they were navigating the PPP loan applications, employment
and furlough decisions for their waitstaffs, as well as the new
health and safety regulations. 137 Nationally, online resources
like Covidloantracker.com 138 sprang up as a form of “mutual
aid” to distribute information for small business owners by
small business owners.
Third, only in later stages of the program’s development
did service professionals such as attorneys and certified
public accountants begin to create a “market” for PPP
expertise. 139 Gaining information from their own
professional networks and exposure to many different
clients, these professionals began to offer webinars,
electronic tools, and other incentives to attract clients to use
their services to help navigate the program. Although none
of our interviewees engaged this “open market” for PPP
services, evidence of its existence and operations is widely
available online and in news reports. 140 The fact that small
business owners, as best as available evidence can
demonstrate, did not rush to enter this new market for
services supports Granovetter’s embeddedness model, which
136. See interviews transcripts, notes, and summaries on file with the authors.
137. Interviews transcripts, notes, and summaries on file with the authors.
138. COVID LOAN TRACKER, https://web.archive.org/web/20200625085228
/https://www.covidloantracker.com/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2021) (“COVID Loan
Tracker is a community of 31,000+ small business owners reporting across all 50
states. Launched by two small business owners, we started with the mission to
help inform other entrepreneurs about when and where PPP and EIDL money is
flowing. In the short-time we have existed, our position has evolved into not only
a data source but a champion of small business in the face of government
ineptitude and the COVID-19 lockdown.”).
139. Interviews transcripts, notes, and summaries on file with the authors.
140. See, e.g., Bruce Willey, PPP Tips: 6 Things to Discuss with Your
Accountant Now, KIPLINGER (July 20, 2020), https://www.kiplinger.com/business
/small-business/small-business-loans/601079/ppp-tips-6-things-to-discuss-withyour.
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posits that business decisions predominantly occur within
established networks rather than in an open market for
services. 141 Only in the late stages of the program did
FinTech firms begin to aggressively use digital advertising
to target small businesses that had not yet applied for the
loans. 142
Indeed, our qualitative observations about business
owners attempting to navigate the PPP evokes a number of
elements of Granovetter’s work. Sociological and economic
models of human action have, respectively, emphasized
under- and over-socialized conceptions of action. 143 Humans
neither make atomistic rational decisions (the Beckerian
view 144) nor do they fully internalize the norms held by their
society (the Parsonian view 145). Instead, in Granovetter’s
argument, they always act within specific social structures
that provide reliable information and expectations about
those around them. 146
Economic action is exemplary of this behavior as
business decisions and information-seeking are most often
conducted within existing social networks that do not neatly
correspond with the idealized versions of frictionless markets
or formal hierarchies. Granovetter makes the case that trust
and the discouragement of malfeasance take place within
141. See Granovetter, supra note 22, at 495–96.
142. See interview transcripts, notes, and summaries on file with the authors.
See also Erel & Liebersohn, supra note 26, at 54.
143. See Granovetter, supra note 22, at 483–84.
144. Economist Gary Becker is well known for using formal rational decision
analysis to model human decision-making outside of the economic realm. See,
e.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976). Mark
Granovetter uses Becker’s work to typify an approach to social science that deemphasizes historical and social situatedness and emphasizes stylized “typical”
actors. See Granovetter, supra note 22, at 486.
145. Sociologist Talcott Parson’s AGIL schema, characterized by Granovetter
as “oversocialized,” emphasizes the complete internalization of social norms and
value structures by actors and, similar to Becker, thus underappreciates the role
of social structure in shaping human action. See id. at 486–487.
146. See Granovetter, supra note 22, at 495–96.
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social structure, where expectations must be set and
economic action tends to become overlaid with social content,
not because of a generalized morality. 147 Most PPP loans,
both legitimate and illegitimate, took place between lenders
and borrowers who knew one another.
In the case of the PPP, we observed evidence that both
supports and contradicts Granovetter’s fundamental
principles. 148 In seeking information and originating loans,
actors did in fact work within their social networks to make
decisions. But new technological tools for organizing many
similar positioned individuals, such as Covidloantracker.com
and the SBA portal itself, provided contexts in which the
embeddedness of economic action may have been less
relevant than the individual and collective characteristics of
the actors.
To conclude, we must note that although borrowerlender interaction was embedded in social structure, lenderSBA interaction was not embedded in social structure in the
strict sense. Rather, it was automatic, blind to abuse yet
capable of threatening retroactive audits. 149 And the greatest
failing of the PPP had less to do with undeserving or
dissatisfied borrowers and more to do with those businesses
that failed before being able to partake of the program’s
support. 150
147. See id. at 489–90.
148. See id. at 490–91.
149. See, e.g., Micah Solomon, Your Audit Risk on PPP Loans Explained, Plus
the Latest on Forgiveness, FORBES (June 4, 2020, 7:04 PM), https://www.forbes
.com/sites/micahsolomon/2020/06/04/your-audit-risk-on-ppp-loans-explainedplus-the-latest-on-forgiveness/ (“Business owners tell us they are worried about
the risk of their PPP loan being audited (or reviewed) and the loan not being
forgiven. They are as scared of one of these audits as they are an IRS audit.”);
Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program—
SBA Loan Review Procedures and Related Borrower and Lender Responsibilities,
Interim Final Rules, 85 Fed. Reg. 33,010, 33,012 (June 1, 2020) (“For a PPP loan
of any size, SBA may undertake a review at any time, at SBA’s discretion.”
(emphasis added)).
150. See Michael S. Barr, Paycheck Protection Program Failed to Reach the
Smallest Businesses: How Congress Can Do Better, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (Apr.
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2. Governmental Oversight of the Program
a. Governmental Narratives
While business owners attempted to navigate the PPP
on the ground, governmental administrators faced a dual
challenge of overseeing and correcting its myriad teething
pains. Unsurprisingly, federal officials scrambling to launch
the PPP developed narratives to make sense of both the scale
of their activity and the time constraints they faced. To study
how those officials grappled with technical problems and
possible solutions for the PPP, we reviewed congressional
hearings held by federal legislators. 151 We invoke the
theoretical work of another preeminent economic sociologist,
Karin Knorr Cetina, 152 to evaluate the extent to which the
SBA as a sociotechnical system precluded forms of sociality
and decision-making that would have permitted greater
transparency, reciprocity, and certainty in the use of the
program.
First, though, we consider the narratives that
governmental officials generated for the program. Scale
manifests itself significantly in the narrativization of the
program as something intimate, taking place almost directly
between legislators and constituents or the Small Business
Administration and small businesses. In a Senate Hearing
on June 10, for instance, SBA head Jovita Carranza
reported—improbably or merely anecdotally—that she was
personally answering emails from small business owners. 153
22, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.crainsdetroit.com/other-voices/paycheckprotection-program-failed-reach-smallest-businesses-how-congress-can-do. But
see Ruth Simon, Covid-19 Shuttered More Than 1 Million Small Businesses. Here
is How Five Survived., WALL ST. J. (Aug. 1, 2020, 12:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/covid-19-shuttered-more-than-1-million-small-businesses-here-is-howfive-survived-11596254424?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=5.
151. See Senate CARES Act Hearing, supra note 30.
152. See generally Karin Knorr Cetina & Urs Bruegger, Global
Microstructures: The Virtual Societies of Financial Markets, 107 AM. J. SOCIO. 905
(2002).
153. See Senate CARES Act Hearing, supra note 30.
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In fact, these relationships were extremely mediated, by an
automated system known as E-Tran and by banking
institutions actually originating the loans. As of June 30,
2020, 4,885,388 small businesses had received loans from the
PPP aggregating to $521.5 billion. 154 Administrator
Carranza was not “personally answering emails” from any
meaningful portion of that population.
In addition to size as a critical narrative element in the
PPP, its administrators also attempted to make sense of the
explosive program in temporal terms. The structure of the
loan program itself shaped temporality in unexpected ways.
At times automated and at times conducted painstakingly by
hand, steps in the process resembled an hourglass with
grains flowing through multiple bulbs and narrow necks as
millions of borrowers engaged thousands of lenders, in only
distant privity with the single SBA agency. In the first days
of lending, media outlets widely reported the surprising news
that smaller banks were able to access loans more quickly
than the largest banks, which either did not engage with the
program at all initially or favored their private clients to the
exclusion of many other potential applicants. 155 Many of the
smaller banks reported that their employees were working
around the clock to fill out applications for hundreds of
borrowers. In these early moments, social ties—including
weak ones, as Granovetter might predict 156—played an
outsized role in the success of entrepreneurs finding loans or
banks willing to lend to them.
Bank employees at smaller banks were not the only ones
working flat out. In the Senate’s June 10, 2020, hearing,
Administrator Carranza claimed that she too was “working
154. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., supra note 8.
155. See, e.g., Cowley, supra note 134 (“Cross River has churned out loans to
more than 106,000 businesses through the Paycheck Protection Program, a
centerpiece of the government’s $2 trillion CARES Act. That puts it just behind
three of the country’s most prolific lenders: Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase
and Wells Fargo.”).
156. See Granovetter, supra note 22, at 490–91.
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around the clock.” 157 Indeed, this sort of testimony is
evidence of the confused temporal scales reported by
participants at the heart of the program in these frantic early
days. Of course, Administrator Carranza’s narrative is not
only temporal, it is also heroic, perhaps as a vaccination
against claims of ineffectiveness or incompetence.
b. Legislative Hearings on the PPP
In addition to these narratives, we consider the oversight
by lawmakers of the federal administrators as they grappled
with technical problems and possible solutions in
congressional hearings. Here, our analysis most closely relies
upon the theoretical work of Mitchel Abolafia 158 who has
studied policy decision-making in terms of the processes by
which policymakers arrive at narrative consensus around
economic ideas. The current administration’s narrative
consensus for the PPP is captured in two quotes from Senate
testimony on the program. First, Senator Marco Rubio,
Chairman of the US Senate Committee on Small Business
and Entrepreneurship, offered the following characterization
of the situation:
As the CAREs act was being negotiated, businesses remember at
that time were faced with the prospect of laying off workers not
because of the weakness in their business model, or a cyclical
downturn in the economy, [but] because the government told them
you can’t operate. You can’t open your doors. You can’t take
customers. You can’t do business. It is in some respects the
equivalent of a taking, in which [the] government and the public
interest intervened and denied people the right to do something.
And we viewed the PPP as what [the] government does when it uses
its power to do that. And that is to help and compensate those who
were damaged by it. With no work available to be done, pure
economic logic told these people in small businesses that the most
efficient thing for them to do was to lay off their workers until more
normal conditions were restored. But we knew that the most
efficient economic outcome was not the best outcome for the

157. See Senate CARES Act Hearing, supra note 30.
158. See generally MITCHEL Y. ABOLAFIA, STEWARDS OF THE MARKET: HOW THE
FEDERAL RESERVE MADE SENSE OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2020).
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common good. [It] would have been catastrophic for our country. 159

Second, Steven Mnuchin, United States Secretary of the
Treasury, proffered this version of the narrative: “This was a
unique situation. This was not due to economic issues. This
was due to government action in shutting down the economy
as a result of COVID-19. So, as I’ve said before, the
traditional economic models are not good at predicting
things.” 160
This narrative from Senator Rubio and Secretary
Mnuchin, invoking biological and “governmental” origins of
the financial crisis, 161 makes it difficult to clearly grasp the
economic model and ideological position of the Trump
administration: was this crisis the fault of a virus or the
government? The implementation of the program was
grounded in a loosely defined “savior” narrative that
emphasized saving small businesses and employment. Once
this consensus was established, at least among the
Republican-controlled Senate and executive branch,
struggles over the program itself were as much technical as
ideological. Because the PPP was financialized, meaning the
stimulus was distributed through loans in an automated
portal between banks and the SBA (known as the E-Tran
system), the design of the sociotechnical system, the
available information about the loans, and the technical
capacity of E-Tran were central in these discussions. 162 Here,
then, is where we see the most helpful purchase of the
intellectual approach of Knorr Cetina and Bruegger 163 for

159. See Senate CARES Act Hearing, supra note 30.
160. See id.
161. See Alan Rappeport & David McCabe, Small-Business Loan Deadline
Poses Test for Mnuchin, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com
/2020/05/13/us/politics/ppp-loan-companies-mnuchin.html.
162. See U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., E-TRAN ELECTRONIC LOAN PROCESSING
(2014),
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/articles/ETran_Origination_01
_2014.pdf.
163. See generally Knorr Cetina & Bruegger, supra note 152.
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framing the possibilities provided by such sociotechnical
systems.
c. Socioeconomic Theory on Governmental Oversight
In her work, Knorr Cetina found the possibility of a
global “we” relation in the digitally mediated interactions of
financial actors. 164 With the PPP, that relationship was
absent, as the actors navigated E-Tran fundamentally
“alone,” with the exception of limited communication
between borrowers and lenders or between borrowers and
other borrowers. The only respite from this situation were
periodic, though somewhat anemic, updates to the
“Frequently Asked Questions” section of the SBA website. 165
Unlike the currency trading that Knorr Cetina and
Bruegger studied, the most striking feature of the SBA
system was its seeming asociality. That is, although social
ties were important for business owners in their initial
search for a bank through which to submit their SBA loan,
the actual issuance of the SBA payment involved minimal, if
any, human interaction. Instead, as SBA Administrator
Jovita Carranza testified in the June 10, 2020, Senate
Hearing, the system was automated through the SBA’s ETran software, 166 the infrastructure that processed nearly
five million loan applications submitted in the first two
rounds of the PPP. 167
Note, importantly, that E-Tran is not a communicative
164. See id. at 920.
165. See, e.g., TREASURY DEP’T, supra note 52.
166. Note that one of the private sector responses to the PPP was technological
tools to help users navigate the SBA system. For example, interfaces for E-Tran
allowed lenders to file hundreds of applications at a time. See U.S. SMALL BUS.
ADMIN., supra note 162.
Some of these solutions, such as Robotic Process Automation systems, were
banned after the first round, while others, such as Application Programming
Interfaces, were not. See Jeff Drew, SBA, Treasury Ban Use of RPA to Submit
PPP Loans, J. ACCT. (Apr 28, 2020), https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/news
/2020/apr/sba-treasury-ban-use-of-rpa-to-submit-ppp-loans.html.
167. See U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., supra note 8.
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interface between the SBA and the lenders; it possesses the
capacity only for “submission” and automatic response based
on algorithmic criteria. 168 Any “social” or interactive
component of the system is merely retroactive (through
possible subsequent audits for problematic or fraudulent
applications) or has been issued as general broadcasts from
the SBA. 169 Thus, the architecture of this electronic system
placed the government in a distinctly powerful role of
benefactor rather than guarantor. Though the loan
application process obviously involved interaction between
the lenders and the borrowers, the program was vulnerable
to unforeseeable structural and social distortions. While an
automated system was not per se responsible for
malfeasance or poor distribution of the funds, the fact that
the system was automated, did not provide clear rules, and
was structured as a first-come first-served competition
independent of any possible microsocial interaction proved
nearly disastrous in the first days of the program. 170 Indeed,
one of the restaurateurs whom we interviewed specifically
blamed this clunky system—devoid of human common
sense—for being unable to substitute an erroneous $23,000
loan for the more than $123,000 she sought. 171
In considering the insights of Knorr Cetina, we note that
the massive PPP program did not, within itself, contain clear
microstructures to coordinate the vast national
implementation of the program. That is, despite the folksy
claim that people like Administrator Carranza were
personally answering emails in the SBA office, 172 the SBA’s
processing of loans through the E-Tran software was entirely
168. See U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., supra note 162.
169. TREASURY DEP’T, supra note 52.
170. See Aaron Gregg, Scathing SBA Watchdog Report Details ‘Pervasive’
Fraud in Coronavirus Disaster-Loan Program, WASH. POST (July 28, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/07/28/scathing-sba-watchdogreport-details-pervasive-fraud-coronavirus-disaster-loan-program/.
171. Interviews transcripts, notes, and summaries on file with the authors.
172. Senate CARES Act Hearing, supra note 30.

2021]

FUNDING CRISES

1605

automated. 173 As we have seen in the most exaggerated cases
of inequitable issuances of loans, the lending “moment” was
not subject to the transparency, reciprocity, or
intersubjectivity that keeps actors from behaving unfairly. 174
This fact, that the epistemic asociality of the program kept
information from flowing to the SBA until well after the
funds were disbursed, confounded the ability of the
administration to properly handle the funds. Further, the
panic and subsequent fear of auditing and sanction by
deserving firms discouraged optimal deployment of the
funds.
The few public hearings and oversight reports on the
CARES Act and PPP reveal institutional logics underpinning
the program. Because these forums allowed for internal
debate amongst government actors on the nature of the
program, the contested narratives of sensemaking and
criteria for evaluating the program were made temporarily
visible, even if in a limited and platitudinous fashion.
Regardless of the rhetorical nature of such events, conflicts
in meaning help us draw provisional ideological lines around
the purpose of the program. Unlike Abolafia’s example, in
which a group of policymakers—on the Federal Open Market
Committee—had to reach a consensus in order to act on
policy, 175 the congressional actors in the PPP did not need to
reach a consistent narrative or consensus, because there was
not a clear single “decision” to be made.
We witnessed the oversight process in the early stages of
the PPP through three primary sets of actors and forums.
First, on May 19, 2020, Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell
and Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin testified before the
US Senate. 176 Second, on June 10, 2020, Mnuchin and SBA
173. See U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., supra note 162.
174. See Knorr Cetina & Bruegger, supra note 152, at 920.
175. See ABOLAFIA, supra note 158.
176. The Quarterly CARES Act Report to Congress: Hearing on the CARES
Act, Before the S. Committee on Banking, Hous., and Urb. Affs. (May 19, 2020),
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Administrator Jovita Carranza met with a bipartisan
committee, the US Senate Committee on Small Business and
Entrepreneurship, led by Republican Chairman Senator
Marco Rubio and Democratic Ranking Member Senator Ben
Cardin. 177 Third and perhaps most strikingly, on May 8,
2020, the Inspector General of the SBA, Hannibal “Mike”
Ware released a sharply critical report on the
implementation of the program. 178
As we noted above, Senator Rubio, justifying the
expansive size of the program, pointed to the fact that the
government “caused” the financial crisis by taking the right
to operate businesses away from people. 179 If the problem
were caused by the government, according to Rubio’s
narrative, there would need to be a government response. In
this way, Rubio legitimized a program that he directly linked
to previous large governmental programs, disfavored by the
Republican party generally, pointing out that it was the
largest since the New Deal. 180 He praised the program for
addressing the Community Development Financial
Institutions and minority deposit institutions, a narrative
contested sharply by the Left. 181 He also praised the swift
implementation of the program and the ability of
government to revise the program according to small
business needs by, among other examples, extending the
program window from eight to twenty-four weeks. 182
https://www.banking.senate.gov/hearings/the-quarterly-cares-act-report-tocongress.
177. See Senate CARES Act Hearing, supra note 30.
178. See SBA INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 4–6.
179. See Senate CARES Act Hearing, supra note 30.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See Hearing on Small Business in Crisis: The 2020 Paycheck Protection
Program and Its Future, Senate Committee on Small Business &
Entrepreneurship (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.sbc.senate.gov/public/index.cfm
/hearings?ID=FC8E242C-B966-4C5A-AD3C-83E17DDE6704. See also Marco
Rubio, Now: Rubio Chairs Hearing on the Implementation of Title I of the CARES
Act (June 10, 2020), https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2020/6/now-
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Senator Cardin, on the other hand, directly linked the
PPP to the broader political protests taking place following
the death of George Floyd. 183 He pointed out how the fiscal
response to the 2008 financial crisis failed to address the
needs of minorities and that minority lending fell after the
2008 financial crisis. 184 Specifically, he cited a Wall Street
Journal article 185 reporting that the virus eliminated the
rising black job market, together with other media
narratives highlighting racial inequality. 186
Administrator Carranza attempted to address Cardin’s
concerns, pointing out how the funds did reach underserved
communities. 187 Oddly, she also addressed the importance of
the SBA hiring in their office of “faith-based initiatives,”
something that was also featured prominently on the SBA
website. 188 She also cited the hiring of thousands of new
employees at the SBA to process the loans for the second
round of the program. 189
Finally, and perhaps most damning, the report issued by
the SBA’s Inspector General 190 concluded that the PPP failed
to accomplish several central goals, as we have noted with
our foregoing quantitative analysis. First, the PPP failed to
prioritize underserved and rural markets. Lenders were not
rubio-chairs-hearing-on-the-implementation-of-title-i-of-the-cares-act.
183. See Senate CARES Act Hearing, supra note 30.
184. Id.
185. Eric Morath & Amara Omeokwe, Coronavirus Obliterated Best AfricanAmerican Job Market on Record, WALL ST. J. (June 16, 2020, 8:30 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-obliterated-best-african-american-jobmarket-on-record-11591714755.
186. See Senate CARES Act Hearing, supra note 30.
187. See id.
188. See id.; see also U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
REGARDING PARTICIPATION OF FAITH BASED ORGANIZATIONS IN THE PAYCHECK
PROTECTION PROGRAM (PPP) AND THE ECONOMIC INJURY DISASTER LOAN PROGRAM
(EIDL) (2020).
189. See Senate CARES Act Hearing, supra note 30.
190. See SBA INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note 21.
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given guidance on these priorities by the SBA and were not
required to collect demographic data. 191 Second, the SBA’s
rules on which loan proceeds were eligible for forgiveness
were unclear, a point the report supported by publishing
inconsistent language from the CARES Act itself, 192 the
Interim Final Rules, 193 and the SBA’s own FAQs. 194 The SBA
also did not offer guidance on loan deferments for
borrowers. 195
To conclude with a reprise of Abolafia, 196 these reports
and hearings reveal the governing party’s narrative attempt
to make sense of a complicated situation. The economic
situation was, for them, not a standard project of
determining acceptable risk within a standard market
ideology, but rather a function of extrinsic biology or—as
Rubio emphasized 197—deleterious government intervention.
3. Fees for Intermediaries
The third group that proved critical to the PPP is
typically the most overlooked, notwithstanding having most
successfully navigated the novel program. 198 Unlike in 2008,
when banks were the chief protagonists in the financial
crisis, in 2020 their role has been ancillary. Indeed, but for
the PPP, they might not have had any role in the COVID-19
crisis whatsoever. But because the PPP situated banks as
critical pieces of the lending infrastructure connecting
191. See id. at 4.
192. Compare SBA INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note 21, with
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134
Stat. 281 (2020) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C).
193. See generally Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck
Protection Program—SBA Loan Review Procedures and Related Borrower and
Lender Responsibilities, Interim Final Rules, 85 Fed. Reg. 33,010 (June 1, 2020).
194. See TREASURY DEP’T, supra note 52.
195. See SBA INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 29.
196. ABOLAFIA, supra note 158.
197. See Senate CARES Act Hearing, supra note 30.
198. See, e.g., Cowley, supra note 134.
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businesses applying for loans with the vast treasury of the
SBA, these banks were featured in every one of the five
million PPP loans. They also profited handsomely from the
program, earning tens of billions of dollars in compensation
for their efforts. 199 But the structure of that compensation,
like so much compensation, may have affected the banks’
incentives in ways that materially affected the program’s
overall outcomes. 200 For that reason and others, their
inclusion in the PPP might have been a mistake.
A general critique of the role of banks and other lenders
in the PPP is simply one of efficiency: interposing financial
intermediaries between lenders and borrowers might have,
as simply a function of increasing the parties to each
transaction, slowed the lending process by requiring more
parties to evaluate each loan while also introducing further
complexity and opportunities for error. The government
has—and could presumably augment—many more direct
connections to citizens and businesses, such as through the
existing payroll system for withholding tax receipts. Indeed,
some called for the issuance of PPP loans via payroll service
firms, such as ADP, rather than via banks. 201
199. See, e.g., Kevin LaCroix, Wells Fargo Hit with First PPP-Related
Securities Class Action, D&O DIARY (June 4, 2020), https://www.dandodiary.com
/2020/06/articles/securities-litigation/wells-fargo-hit-with-first-ppp-relatedsecurities-class-action.
200. The intersection of small business lending and government, despite the
outsize influence of small businesses on employment, has not been a central
concern for economists, who often focus on the perspective of banks rather than
firm borrowers when they do study small business lending. Balla et al. ask
whether the Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF) of the TARP response to the
2008–2010 Great Recession, as one key example, actually increased lending to
small business. They found that banks were divided in their use of the funds:
many banks experiencing stronger growth did in fact use SBLF funds to expand
small business lending while already distressed banks tended to use funds to
repay their own TARP obligations. Eliana Balla et al., The Other Capital Infusion
Program: The Case of the Small Business Lending Fund, 34 REV. FIN. ECON. 99,
99–108 (2017).
201. See, e.g., Jim Cramer (@JimCramer), TWITTER (Apr. 13, 2020, 9:39 AM),
https://twitter.com/jimcramer/status/1249693777066893312 (“Let ADP or
Paychex help.”); Stephanie Ruhle (@SRuhle), TWITTER (Apr. 8, 2020, 6:33 AM),
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A more pointed criticism is that the rule governing the
compensation of banks—which awarded higher fees for
larger loans, instead of a per-loan compensation—created
incentives for lenders that could and did distort policy goals.
The lending institutions that processed PPP loans earned
fees on a sliding scale: On loans of $350,000 or less in total
dollars approved, the lenders received 5%; On loans between
$350,000 and $2,000,000, they received 3%; And on loans of
$2,000,000 or more, they earned 1%. 202 A program targeting
small businesses would presumably have preferred that the
funds flowed to one hundred small businesses rather than to
a single large one. 203 A single, flat fee would have eliminated
any bias towards larger applicants; indeed, assuming their
paperwork was more complicated, it might have actually
skewed lending activity towards smaller firms with simpler
balance sheets, payrolls, and applications.
Finally, the fact that more than twenty-four billion
dollars went to financial firms rather than to the small
businesses that were the program’s intended beneficiaries is
less than optimal, 204 particularly if the distribution process
could have been done without the cost of their
intermediation.

https://twitter.com/SRuhle/status/1247834935471353862 (“What if govt paid
everyone directly through existing payroll (ADP & other large payroll outfits) not
SBA or a million banks.”).
202. Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) Information Sheet Lenders, TREASURY
DEP’T, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/PPP%20Lender%20Informatio
n%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf.
203. See, e.g., Courtney Weaver, Luxury Fashion and Law Firms Among US
Bailout Recipients, FIN. TIMES (July 7, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content
/67aec12a-e744-4bcb-ba91-7e7887e5363e.
204. See Benoit & Rudegeair, supra note 15.
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III. DESIGNING FUTURE EMERGENCY FUNDING PROGRAMS
Whatever one concludes about the efficacy of the PPP,
there is very little doubt that the program might have been
more effective had it been more thoroughly planned and
prepared in advance. The ad hoc, emergency nature of the
program certainly contributed to several of its earliest
missteps and lasting problems—rampant confusion amongst
the program’s participants was a critical failing, widely
reported in the media and in our own interviews during this
study. 205 Our quantitative and qualitative findings lead us to
urge scholars and policymakers to begin planning now for
similar programs that might be needed in the future.
A. Rationales for Planning Now
Perhaps the chief obstacle to planning for unprecedented
challenges is that the costs involved today might never be
redeemed by eventual benefits. By their very nature,
extraordinarily rare occurrences do not tend to recur with
sufficient frequency or certainty to guarantee a return on the
preparation of their countermeasures. But the fact that we
have, in such quick succession, experienced massive,
systemically disastrous crises in both 2008 and 2020
suggests that we can no longer afford to be complacent. If
once-in-a-century floods occur twice in a dozen years, it is
time to raise the levees or at least to plan for how to do so. 206
Indeed,

as

our

economy

becomes

increasingly

205. See interviews transcripts, notes, and summaries on file with the authors.
206. In broader academic literature, particularly sociology, the link between
social and economic structures, health crises, and community well-being has been
an extremely active field of study for both quantitative and qualitative
researchers. Among qualitative researchers, Eric Klinenberg’s Heat Wave (2002)
is exemplary. Klinenberg studied how welfare retrenchment, social isolation, and
institutional abandonment led to higher mortality rates in poor and minority
communities during the 1995 Chicago heat wave. Although Klinenberg was not
focused on economic impacts, his events-based analysis of uneven access to care
mirrors the uneven distribution of small business loans in divested communities.
See ERIC KLINENBERG, HEAT WAVE 11, 18–24, 164 (2002).
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financialized—through, in some measure, a more ubiquitous
reliance upon 401(k) plans for retirement funding 207—then
economic crises will tend to have greater national fallout.
The devastation of one portion of the US economy may have
an increasing tendency to inflict deleterious effects
throughout the country, rather than simply remaining
local. 208
Perhaps the most pointed reason to plan for the future is
because the crisis of 2020 has not yet ended. 209 So the first
new version of a crisis funding program might be yet another
wave in the ongoing response to COVID-19 and its variants.
Consider the dimming prospects for a vibrant economy
recovery at that time: broad economic indicators were
weakening, 210 job figures were declining with fewer workers
than prior to the pandemic, 211 and travel data from the TSA
suggested a once-improving market in flights had
subsequently softened 212 and was not projected to recover
207. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. BIRDTHISTLE, EMPIRE OF THE FUND: THE WAY WE SAVE
NOW 1–2 (2016).
208. See Joyce M. Rosenberg, Loan Program Ends, Hard-Hit Businesses Hope
for 2nd Chance, AP NEWS (Aug. 7, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/virusoutbreak-business-small-business-9746737060a0a1d5745cb72cd0025500.
209. See Lauren Fedor et al., Dispute Over Aid for Cities and States Slows US
Stimulus Talks, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/312e6aa2be03-4963-a951-1b820dea671e; Annie Lowrey, Don’t Bet on a Quick Recovery,
THE ATLANTIC (June 25, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020
/06/no-quick-recovery/613462/.
210. See Dion Rabouin, The Economic Recovery Is Reversing, AXIOS (July 22,
2020), https://www.axios.com/economic-recovery-stall-coronavirus-stimulus-19cf
b417-c428-4f22-80c5-5e6d5afbd7ef.html (“The New York Fed’s Weekly Economic
Index (WEI) is reversing course, showing real-time, high-frequency economic
data is again turning negative after climbing back from April and May’s
coronavirus-driven swoon.”); Annie Lowrey, The Second Great Depression, THE
ATLANTIC (June 23, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06
/second-great-depression/613360/.
211. See Greg Iacurci, 6 Reasons Why Americas Aren’t Returning to Work,
CNBC (Oct. 20, 2021, 1:47 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/20/6-reasonswhy-americans-arent-returning-to-work.html.
212. See TSA Checkpoint Travel Numbers (Current Year Versus Prior
Year(s)/Same Weekday), TRANSP. SAFETY ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov
/coronavirus/passenger-throughput (last visited Dec. 27, 2020).
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until as late as 2024. 213
The US GDP numbers from the second quarter of 2020
revealed a devastating drop of 10%. 214 The Wall Street
Journal reported that the US economy contracted at a record
32.9% annual rate in the second quarter of 2020 and weekly
jobless claims rose to 1.43 million amid signs of a slowing
recovery. 215 Indeed, some projections at the time suggested
that as many as one-third of all US restaurants would go out
of business by the end of 2020. 216 We are also facing an
eviction crisis. “Every year in America, 3.7 million evictions
are filed,” which has greater salience amidst a pandemic
because “[t]hat’s going to mean that our homeless shelter
system is flooded and stressed. Shelter systems are really
important but they’re horrible for social distancing.” 217
Another reason for planning now is the availability of
better data and data analytics on how best to devise a
program such as this. Compared to the kinds of analyses that
economists like Chetty et al., Autor et al., and others are
running, the government’s targeting systems for funding
relief are quite crude. As global experts have improved their
213. See David McHugh, Air Travel Not Expected to Recover Until 2024, AP
NEWS (July 28, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/air-travel-travel-changingeconomy-airlines-business-73b55c3da0a07012f20bd6913743e806; see also Alison
Sider, American Airlines Plans to Furlough up to 25,000 Workers this Fall, WALL
ST. J. (July 15, 2020, 6:17 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/american-airlinesplans-to-furlough-up-to-25-000-workers-this-fall-11594849477.
214. Gross Domestic Product (GDP), U.S. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS (Nov. 24,
2021), https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDP.
215. Harriet Torry, U.S. Economy Contracted at Record Rate Last Quarter;
Jobless Claims Rise to 1.43 Million, WALL ST. J. (July 30, 2020, 3:21 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/us-economy-gdp-report-second-quartercoronavirus-11596061406.
216. See Rachel King, More Than 110,000 Eating and Drinking Establishments
Closed in 2020, FORTUNE (Jan. 26, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://fortune.com/2021/01/26
/restaurants-bars-closed-2020-jobs-lost-how-many-have-closed-us-covidpandemic-stimulus-unemployment/.
217. See Noel King, It ‘Looks Very Scary for Renters’ as Federal Eviction Relief
Expiration Nears, NPR (July 21, 2020, 5:04 PM), https://www.npr.org
/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/07/21/893406577/as-protections-expiremillions-of-americans-face-threats-of-eviction.
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skills with two major rounds of PPP funding, they are well
situated to plan for the future. A nimble economic response
team using machine learning and statistical tools could more
quickly identify ways of automatically targeting firms or
individuals that are most at risk in the next financial crisis.
A final rationale for planning today is more optimistic
and less directly related to COVID-19. Spurred on by the
candidacy of Andrew Yang, the idea of a Universal Basic
Income (UBI) has been gaining widespread public interest.
UBI has enjoyed a significant amount of coverage in the
press, 218 preceded by several years of more serious academic
scholarship. 219
Thus, rationales certainly exist for both the motivation
to plan now and its possible efficacy for ameliorating future
economic crises.
B. Comparative Analysis of Foreign Programs
The United States has, unfortunately, endured a
particularly poor response, both economically and medically,
to the pandemic. Thus, one simple possibility for developing
a superior plan would be to consult programs that have
succeeded in other nations. France, for example, maintained
lower unemployment levels at a far lower cost than the US
plan. Other countries do not, of course, feature the variety of
cultures, communities, and other variables that might
confound the ability of the United States to adopt foreign
plans wholesale in this country. Yet comparative analyses

218. See Brooks Rainwater & Clay Dillow, Is the Pandemic Finally the Moment
for a Universal Basic Income?, FAST CO. (July 20, 2020), https://www.fastcompany
.com/90529479/is-the-pandemic-finally-ubis-moment.
219. See ESTHER DUFLO & ABHIJIT V. BANERJEE, GOOD ECONOMICS FOR HARD
TIMES (2019); ANNIE LOWREY, GIVE PEOPLE MONEY: HOW A UNIVERSAL BASIC
INCOME WOULD END POVERTY, REVOLUTIONIZE WORK, AND REMAKE THE WORLD 4–
11 (2018); ANDREW YANG, THE WAR ON NORMAL PEOPLE: THE TRUTH ABOUT
AMERICA’S DISAPPEARING JOBS AND WHY UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME IS OUR FUTURE
(2018).
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may nevertheless yield illuminating insights. 220
Studying Japan in a non-crisis setting, Wilcox and
Yasuda found that access to government guaranteed loans
for small- and medium-sized enterprises led banks to make
riskier lending decisions to small businesses across their
portfolios, in both their guaranteed and non-guaranteed
loans, indicating measured success in expanding lending but
also greater potential for default. 221 One conclusion from this
setting is that non-intermediated grants, rather
financialized loans, may actually protect the financial sector
from the volatility associated with lending in crisis times.
Further reflecting volatility in the sector, Kiser et al. have
modeled that changes in bank ratings by rating agencies
during the Great Recession had a disproportionate effect on
the number of loans made to small businesses. 222 Because
small businesses employ higher numbers of people, this
study underscored the precarity of the sector: volatile
financial markets can lead to banks suddenly pulling out of
lending to small businesses. 223 These studies are relevant to
our endeavor as they directly challenge the sociologists’
usual path of assessing economic interventions based on
structural inequalities, instead considering economic
indicators as opposed to ground level data and observations.
Although these studies may directly avoid the political
aspects of political economy (i.e., they question the outcomes
of processes rather than the social basis for decisionmaking), they nevertheless speak to the possibility that
intervening in the small business sector of the economy could
alleviate, or exacerbate, financial distress.
220. See, e.g., Cohen-Setton & Pisani-Ferry, supra note 25, at 1–3, 16.
221. See James A. Wilcox & Yukihiro Yasuda, Government Guarantees of
Loans to Small Businesses: Effects on Banks’ Risk-Taking and Non-Guaranteed
Lending, 37 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 45, 46–48 (2019).
222. See Elizabeth K. Kiser et al., Supervisory Ratings and Bank Lending to
Small Businesses During the Financial Crisis and Great Recession, 50 J. FIN.
SERV. RSCH. 163, 184–85 (2016).
223. Id. at 164.
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The example of France in the present economic crisis is
telling. In their comparative work, Cohen-Setton and PisaniFerry have emphasized the greater robustness of automatic
income stabilization mechanisms in France that have kept
unemployment at one-fifth of the level of the US for half of
the cost. 224 Indeed, rather than a heroic or savior narrative,
as we have seen in the US case, the French case provides a
model for a flexible social safety net planned well in advance
of crises. More comparative studies such as this one, by
experts in both comparative law and economics, will prove
vital tools as we move forward.
C. Critical Components of Funding Programs
Based on our own findings and lessons from other
nations, we believe a number of critical components—as an
initial list to consider in future scholarship—would be useful
elements to include in any future program to fund an
economic crisis.
But perhaps the single most important goal for a future
program should be to connect lenders or beneficiaries more
directly with the ultimate source of government funding.
That is, financial intermediaries such as banks and other
lending institutions should be removed from the funding
pipeline. Those players add complexity and cost at times of
exigency when speed and simplicity are paramount.
Spatial disparities in financial access, such as between
rural and urban dwellers, have also been of concern to
sociologists. Tolbert et al. have made an important
contribution studying the decline of small banks in rural
areas over the past decades. 225 Our analyses show that loans
per capita in the first round of the PPP were actually
concentrated in rural and midwestern areas, suggesting an
interesting puzzle for future research about how those loans
224. See, e.g., Cohen-Setton & Pisani-Ferry, supra note 25, at 1–3, 16.
225. See Tolbert et al., supra note 60, at 375–77.
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got to those communities. Crowley and Stainback have
recently written on the negative effects of retail
concentration and declining small business presence on
community wellbeing. 226 If the SBA program fails to sustain
many small businesses, we can expect that these trends will
only increase. In future research, the SBA program could be
assessed from this perspective, with analyses of its long-term
impacts on economic and social well-being. 227
To receive a loan from a bank during this crisis, one had
to have—or had to form—a relationship with a bank or other
financial lender. A growing body of literature grapples with
the various social dimensions and implications of the
“unbanked.” Historically, barriers impeded access to fair
lending. Other researchers have focused on the role of
culture in attitudes about incurring debt. In How the Other
Half Banks, Mehrsa Baradaran historicizes the phenomenon
of poorer consumers tending to pay more for their banking
services. Baradaran proposes a return to banking through
post offices as one possible solution. 228 Important for our
study and its future iterations, we must consider which small
businesses failed to receive PPP loans and why that might be
the case. Our qualitative findings point largely to
informational mismatches between the administration of the
SBA and the states most impacted by the pandemic, between
economic actors and financial institutions, and between the
US government and its constituency.
Cutting out financial intermediaries from future funding
programs could, in addition, reduce perverse distortions that
cause money to flow away from the beneficiaries that need it
most.
226. See Martha Crowley & Kevin Stainback, Retail Sector Concentration,
Local Economic Structure, and Community Well-Being, 45 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 321,
337–38 (2019).
227. See, e.g., Benjamin A. Austin et al., Jobs for the Heartland: Place-Based
Policies in 21st-Century America, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring
2018, at 151, 223–24.
228. See generally MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS (2015).
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CONCLUSION
The apocryphal curse, “may you live in interesting
times,” certainly hexed the year 2020. Much of what we in
the United States and throughout the world endured—the
virus, strict lockdowns, and economic collapse—certainly
was interesting and, collectively, unprecedented. But the
mere fact that things are unprecedented does not necessarily
make them unforeseeable. With foresight ought to have come
preparation and competent governance. Yet, exacerbating
much of our recent travails has been the persistent blight of
incompetent government. In this Article, we have attempted
to provide an early, but comprehensive, analysis of the most
important component of the largest bailout of a financial
crisis in US history: the PPP. 229 We have conducted both a
quantitative empirical analysis of data surrounding the
program and a socioeconomic examination of the experiences
of business owners trying to navigate the program.
Major, unprecedented events tend, of course, to generate
cascades of historical contingencies and unforeseen
consequences. Much of what has occurred with the financial
response to COVID-19, however, has been precedented and
thus potentially foreseeable. That the program to support an
economy reeling from historically disastrous losses in
employment and productivity would be expensive and
complicated was readily foreseeable, as so much of the global
economy endured a trial run of massive government bailouts
just a dozen years before. That such a program would be
confusing to its beneficiaries was also predictable, as our tax
system continues to confound millions of Americans each
year more than a century after the advent of a federal
personal income tax in 1913. 230 So what might have been
done—might still be done—to produce better governance in
future?
229. See Brewster, supra note 91.
230. See Joseph A. Hill, The Income Tax of 1913, 28 Q.J. ECONOMICS 46, 46–47
(1913).
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We must look both backward and forward. Even though
the financial crisis of 2008 involved primarily governmental
support of large financial institutions, many commentators
urged the Obama administration to make payments directly
to homeowners who were struggling to make their mortgage
payments. 231 Had they done so, or had a plan simply been
prepared, then 2008 could have served as a sound model to
borrow for the PPP in 2020.
Rather than intervening successfully at an early stage,
the failure to do so has led to greater problems and even more
dire levels of economic distress for states and citizens.
Similarly, poor public health decisions throughout the
country have allowed waves of the virus to spread
aggressively, squandering the sacrifices of millions of
Americans and, quite possibly, much of the money spent
under the CARES Act.
So, we conclude with a call for lawmakers to master
unlearned lessons and to prepare now for the future,
specifically with more efficient ways to connect the
government’s treasure to its citizenry. Other countries
flooded their business communities with support far more
efficiently than the United States did, 232 even though this
country has effectively built a pipeline in the other direction
for taxpayers to remit their payments to the governmental
treasuries. We endured both 2008 and 2020, and it would be
folly not to expect further economic dislocations in future.
231. See, e.g., Rob Johnson & George Soros, A Better Bailout Was Possible
During the Financial Crisis, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 18, 2018, 3:24 PM), https://
www.theguardian.com/business/2018/sep/18/bailout-financial-crisis-donaldtrump-barack-obama-george-soros.
232. Internationally, in response to the crisis, Germany guaranteed loans to
all businesses that needed one through its $100 billion economic stabilization
fund. See Julia Anderson et al., The Fiscal Response to the Economic Fallout from
the Coronavirus, BRUEGEL, https://www.bruegel.org/publications/datasets/covidnational-dataset (Nov. 24, 2020). Other governments, like Japan, instead have
supported workers through a mix of direct payments to individuals and firms.
See Policy Responses to COVID-19, INT’L MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org
/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19 (last visited Dec. 27,
2021).
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To consider this prospect through a slightly more
optimistic lens, one cheerful piece of news from the pandemic
has been that the massive government payments might have
alleviated measures of poverty across America. 233 So, even if
we do not endure a third great financial collapse in the years
ahead, the CARES Act might furnish empirical support and
inspiration for serious consideration of universal basic
income. Again, unprecedented times do generate unforeseen
outcomes, and UBI could be the next occasion on which the
government disburses financial support across the United
States. Happily, those payments, if successful, would not be
yet another haphazard reaction to a crisis, but rather the
proactive alleviation of social blights such as poverty and all
that they threaten to the social fabric of the world.

233. See DeParle, supra note 80; Jason DeParle, Vast Federal Aid Has Capped
Rise in Poverty, Studies Find, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes
.com/2020/06/21/us/politics/coronavirus-poverty.html.

